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SUMMARY 
This study arose from the experience of difficulties in individuating incorporating 
tensions in the self-group, self-other, and self-self relational dimensions. This situation 
initiated the questions: What does individuation mean in collectivist cultures? Can self-
e.xpression occur in a different way to opposing public opinion? Can one conceptualise 
experiential dialectics to facilitate their resolution in practice? The literature initiated 
the questions: How do Western theories on individuation incorporate 'culture'? Does 
a relationship between the socio-cultural context and the process of self-expression 
exist? Conclusions were: 
- that the socio-cultural context influences this experience directly by influencing the 
process of self-expression via defining what is experienced as narcissistic, altruistic, 
or individualistic behaviour, and indirectly by the theories which reflect its norms; 
- that the relationship between experience, and theory and personal epistemologies 
potentially initiate tensions, and facilitate their resolution; 
- that a theory of individuation in collectivist cultures is lacking. 
A way of interpreting 'individuation' was discussed. 
---oOo---
Individuation; Experience; Theory; Self; Relationship; Socio-Cultural Context; 
Separateness-Togetherness; Individualist; Collectivist; Identity. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
• 
This study was initiated by the a priori situation of difficulties in the experience of 
individuating. In this situation, the experience of difficulties in individuating was 
intimately tied up with Western, psychodynamic concepts of what individuation means, 
namely: becoming the separate, self-contained, independent individual, and being 
self-expressive (or self-assertive). Such concepts were also experienced as societal 
prescriptions and thus as having normative value. 
This a priori situation gave rise to three points of enquiry. The first point of enquiry 
involved a question: would one experience difficulties in individuation if societal 
prescriptions of what individuation entails was not that of becoming the separate, 
self-contained, independent individual? This gave rise to a related question: what 
could individuation be seen to entail in a collectivist culture? To address such a 
question, a discussion of various writers' descriptions of individuation in collectivist 
cultures would be required. It was thought that such an exploration would aid in 
resolving difficulties in the experience of individuating by deconstructing 
conceptualisations of individuation given normative value by Western discourse 
practices. This focus of enquiry pointed to a presumed link between experience and 
the socio-cultural context. 
From the literature search, two points of enquiry related to the idea of a presumed 
link between experience and the socio-cultural context arose. 
Theorising about individuation has already been undertaken from a vast number of 
sources reflecting a wide range of theoretical perspectives. To use Mazor and 
Enright's (1988) and Rice, Cole, and Lapsley's ( 1990) categorisation, these theoretical 
perspectives include: psychoanalytic (e.g., Blas, 1967; Josselson, 1980; Jung, 1959; 
Mahler, 1972a), ego developmental (Erikson, 1950 in Rice et al., 1990), interpersonal 
(e.g., Cooper, Grotevant, & Condon, 1983), systemic (e.g., Bowen, 1985; Gavazzi & 
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Sabatelli, 1990; Haley, 1980; Karpel, 1976; Sabatelli & Mazor, 1985; Stierlin, 1994), 
and social cognitive (Mazor & Enright, 1988). In addition to these, there have also 
been a couple of original theories (Kegan, 1982; Stern, 1985). Furthermore, feminist 
writers have also theorised about individ~ation (e.g., Jordan, 1991; Miller, 1991; 
Surrey, 1991 ). In addition to these modern theoretical perspectives, there have also 
been postmodern theories. In traditional thought, the individuation construct 
incorporates the ideas of lineal developmental process towards some static end-point, 
namely: the 'self, person, or individual. In contrast, postmodern thought takes this 
static endpoint and conceptualises the 'self construct not in terms of an entity - the 
self-contained individual, but in terms of a process, the construction of self in the 
socio-linguistic domain of relating, or the empty self in the everchanging world of 
experience. Hence, theories of individuation in postmodern thought have been in terms 
of the 'self construct (e.g., Gergen, 1991; Harre, 1991; Hermans, Kempen, & Van Loon, 
1992; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991 ). Furthermore, there have also been attempts 
at integrating two or more theories on individuation. For example, Karpel (1976) 
undertook to combine psychodynamic and systemic perspectives and Mazor, Alfa, and 
Gampel (1993) undertook to combine social cognitive and object-relations 
perspectives. Mitchell's (1991) article also focuses on an integration. Furthermore, 
Blustein and Noumair (1996, p. 437) put forward a particular approach when theorising 
about individuation which they call an "embeddedness perspective". Blustein and 
Noumair ( 1996, p. 437) urge the reader to take into account the relational and cultural 
influences when theorising about any psychological construct, which in their case is the 
"interpersonal experience" of "self or identity". 
It is clear that all these theorists theorise about individuation as it occurs in a 
Western cultural context. Thus, the first point of enquiry to arise from the literature 
involved addressing how, or if, Western theories on individuation take into account the · 
notion of culture. It was concluded that these theorists describe a relationship between 
the notion of culture (variously defined) and a static sub-construct of the individuation 
construct, for example, 'self or 'self-concept'. Other studies on the presumed 
relationship between the notions of individuation and culture have largely been in terms 
of conceptualising how the 'self construct is viewed differently by individualist and 
collectivist cultural discourse practices (Markus & Kitayama, 1991 ). Hence, the second 
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point of enquiry which arose from the literature was: can a relationship be seen to exist 
between the notion of culture and a dynamic sub-construct of the individuation 
construct? In other words, can a relationship be seen to exist between the 
socio-cultural context and the process of self-expression? 
Before outlining the second and third points of enquiry to arise from the a priori 
situation of difficulties in individuating, an outline of what this situation entailed needs 
to be given. 
This situation involved difficulties in the experience of being and becoming an 
individual. Difficulties in the experience of being and becoming an individual involved 
tensions in the self-other (Allison & Sabatelli, 1988) dialectic. In this study, the term 
'self-other' will be used to indicate the following relational dimensions: 
(1) self in relation to group (or socio-cultural context) 
(2) self in relation to other (another person) 
(3) self in relation to self (intrapsychic experience). 
Difficulties in the experience of being an individual incorporated mainly the relational 
dimensions of self-group and self-self. This involved difficulties in being self-assertive 
or self-expressive in relation to group, and difficulties in being self-acceptant in relation 
to self. 
Difficulties in being self-expressive in relation to group involved the tension between 
individuality versus group acceptance. Self-expressiveness or self-assertiveness was 
experienced to be detrimental to relational harmony and group interest. It was felt that 
by being self-expressive one would risk losing group acceptance. It was thought that 
if one could find another way by which self-expression can be seen to occur, not by 
opposing group interest, a way of resolving the opposite poles of this tension would be 
found. 
Examples of theories which address this tension between individuality and group 
acceptance is Winnicott's theory about the "true" and "false" self (in Mitchell, 1991, p. 
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133). It may be interpreted that the 'true self symbolises the expression of individuality, 
and the 'false self, conformity and compliance to group norms and group interest to 
ensure group acceptance. Jung's (1959) theory also addresses this tension between 
individuality and group acceptance. However, Jung's (1959) theory was chosen as a 
basis for finding a way of resolving this tension because the individuality versus group 
acceptance tension may be interpreted to be at the heart of his theory on individuation. 
Individuality, self-expression or self-assertiveness can be said to be incorporated in 
Jung's (1959, p. 174) theory on individuation by the phrase: "divesting the self of the 
false wrappings of the persona". This may be interpreted as involving self-expression 
in the face of contrasting public opinion 1 or that the person is prepared to go against 
public opinion if it opposes his/her wishes, goals, convictions. The resolution of this 
tension to be drawn from Jung's (1959) writing involved ensuring individuality even at 
the expense of losing group acceptance. Hence, the second point of enquiry to arise 
from the a priori situation was: can self-expression (individuality) be seen to occur in 
a way other than by opposing public opinion, if public opinion contrasts with one's 
wishes, goals, pursuits? In other words, it was intended to find a way of self-expression 
which would preserve both poles of the individuality versus group acceptance tension. 
Difficulties in the experience of becoming an individual incorporated mainly the 
self-other relational dimension. This involved becoming separate, self-contained and 
independent in relation to the 'other'. The third point of enquiry to arise from the a priori 
situation involved the self-other and self-self relational dimensions. The third point of 
enquiry involved the intention to gain a conceptual understanding of what individuation 
could be said to entail. This would involve interpretations from theory. It was also 
intended to gain a conceptual understanding of what was experienced as difficulties in 
individuating. What was experienced as difficulties in individuating took on expression · 
in the form of various dialectics or themes. It was thought that one could try and 
resolve tensions in practice by integrating them in theory or by simply conceptualising 
them. This enquiry pointed to a presumed link between experience and theory. 
Please note, the term 'public opinion' is intended to mean, for example, conventions, role 
expectations, not macro-societal discourse practices. 
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The first chapter will address two of the three points of enquiry which arose from the 
a priori situation. These are: can self-expression be seen to occur in any way, other 
than by opposing public opinion if public opinion goes contrary to one's wishes, goals, 
pursuits?, and: what can individuation be seen to entail in a collectivist cultural 
context? The first chapter will also address both the two points of enquiry which arose 
from the literature search. These are: do Western theories on individuation take into 
account the notion of culture, and if so, how? And, can a relationship be seen to exist 
between the socio-cultural context and the process of self-expression? These 
questions relate to, or address tensions in what can be called the self-group relational 
dimension. 
Both the second and the third chapters will address the remaining point of enquiry 
which arose from the a priori situation. This involved attempting to find out whether the 
resolution of experiential tensions would be facilitated by integrating these dialectics 
in theory, simply conceptualising them, or by gaining theoretical understandings or 
interpretations of what individuation can be said to entail. The second chapter will 
address this point of enquiry in terms of experiential tensions in the self-other relational 
dimension, and the third chapter, in terms of the self-self relational dimension. 
The final chapter will contain an illustration and discussion of conclusions drawn from 
the process of the search to facilitate individuation by conceptualising or integrating 
experiential themes or dialectics in theory. In the final chapter a particular 
conceptualisation of individuation in terms of the notion of freedom, and on the basis 
of various theories will be discussed. This can be said to be a way of facilitating 
individuation in practice by conceptualising it in theory. 
Please note the following: 
(1) That the phrases, "it can be said" or "it can be seen", are used to indicate that the 
idea or comment being expressed is not regarded as having objective reality but 
linguistic reality, that is, it exists only as an idea or thought. Hence, the word is is used 
in the phrases "what is meant" or "a comment is" to similarly reflect that it is the 
comment or the idea that is regarded as real. These phrases are used to reflect a 
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postmodern stance in the author's thinking. 
(2) That the phrases: "may be interpreted as", "may be regarded as", "may mean", 
"may be described as", "may be concluded", "'may be drawn from", "may be explained" 
reflect the author's usage of other writers' ideas. 
(3) That in general, the language of paragraphs where writers are referred to by 
various means, for example, "according to", "for'', or by stating the name of the writer, 
in most cases, reflects the writing of that writer unless otherwise indicated. Hence, 
some paragraphs may reflect an objectivist epistemology. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SELF IN RELATION TO GROUP 
.. 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the following questions will be addressed: Firstly, do Western 
theories on individuation take into account the notion of culture, and if so, how? 
Secondly, can self-expression be seen to occur in any way, other than by opposing 
public opinion if public opinion goes contrary to one's wishes, goals, pursuits? Thirdly, 
can a relationship be seen to exist between the notion of culture and a dynamic 
sub-construct of the individuation construct? (Fourie, Personal communication, 1996) 
In other words, can a relationship be seen to exist between the socio-cultural context 
and the process of self-expression? Fourthly, what can individuation be seen to entail 
in a collectivist cultural context? 
The Notion of Culture in Western Theories on Individuation 
In this section, how or if modern and postmodern theories on individuation take into 
account the notion of culture will be addressed. In order to do so, a description of how 
'self is conceptualised in modern and postmodern theories on individuation needs to 
be given. The description of the 'self construct is thought to be necessary in order to 
describe more fully the presumed role that 'culture' is theorised to play in theories on 
individuation. The terms 'self-concept' and 'sense-of-self will be used to aid in 
describing the notion of 'self. 
'Self-concept' can be said to be narrowly defined as how one sees oneself, for· 
example, as serious, hardworking. 'Self-concept' is a term from Rogers's theory of 
personality (Pervin, 1970, p. 177) referring to an "organised and consistent pattern of 
perceptions". However, here it will be used not in terms of its original definition, but as 
a metaphor to emphasise the cognitive, verbally mediated processes involved in 
'self-construction'. Sense-of-self is not a theoretical term per se but it can be seen as 
an ordinary descriptive term to capture what Stern (1985) best describes as 
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non-self-reflexive, nonverbal awareness. Hence, an artificial distinction, namely: a 
verbal, self-reflexive extraction from experience (self-concept) and nonverbal, 
experiential awareness (sense-of-self) will be used. The term 'self-knowledge' can also 
be seen to involve a verbal, self-reflective &tance. These three terms: self-concept, 
sense-of-self, and self-knowledge will be used in the next discussion. 
The Notion of Culture in Modern. Western Theories on Individuation 
In this section three theoretical perspectives from a modern perspective will be used 
to address the question of how, or if the notion of culture is used in their 
conceptualisations of 'self. First the systemic perspective will be addressed, followed 
by the psychodynamic and feminist perspectives. 
Bowen's (1985) and Kerr's (1988) theorising will be used as an example of the 
systemic conceptualisation of 'self. The 'self here can be said to be the ability to have 
convictions, opinions, ideas independent of emotional pressure to be the same as the 
group. It can also be said to be the ability to respond flexibly with communicational 
responses involving closeness (e.g., agreeing, compromising}, or distance (e.g., 
disagreeing, uncompromising). This presupposes emotional neutrality or the ability to 
reflect on one's emotional reactions and not automatically react so as to achieve 
emotional equilibrium. Hence, the self in this conceptualisation can be said to involve 
emotional, cognitive, and communicational capacities. 
This paragraph will address what role the notion of culture is theorised to have on 
this systemic conceptualisation of self. Bowen's (1985), and Kerr's (1988) theory can 
be said to be acultural if culture is seen in terms of society's prescriptions of what the 
self should be. Kerr (1988) does not theorise about how culture can be seen to affect 
the development of these emotional, cognitive, and communicational capacities. 
However, he does focus on the effect of the emotional-relational milieu of the family on 
this development. However, this very milieu can be said to be a cultural artefact of or 
as being influenced by the cultural context of, for example, collectivist or individualist 
societies. 
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Kerr (1988) places a normative value on a relational milieu where there is flexibility 
in styles of relating permitting various degrees of closeness and distance between its 
members. However, this normative stance can be said to be an outcome of an 
individualist (Western) culture from which this theory arises. The nonnormative value 
(as considered from within a Western cultural context), namely, a restrictive 
unidimensional style of relating where only one pattern of distance regulation is 
maintained, for example, closeness, may be considered to be the norm in collective 
cultures such as Japanese and Indian societies. Hence, culture can be theorised to 
influence the development of self (or cognitive, emotional, and communicational 
capacities) indirectly via its influence on the family relational milieu. If one focuses on 
the communicational capacities of this self-conceptualisation, then culture can also be 
said to reciprocally influence the patterns of communicating/relating indirectly via the 
notion of 'boundary' formation. 'Boundary' may be considered as that which regulates 
the type of communicational exchanges occuring in stereotypical relational dyads of, 
for example, gender, age, and hierarchical dimensions. What regulates these 
communicational exchanges can be said to be culturally defined expectations or 
common knowledges of what is acceptable behaviour within these stereotypical 
relational dyads. Hence, in collectivist cultures age differences may be a more 
determining factor of the type of communicational exchanges occuring in a relational 
dyad, as compared to, for example, a Western culture. 
However, Kerr (1988) does not include the role of culture in his conceptualisation of 
'self. 
The conceptualisational 'self, from a psychodynamic perspective, will be addressed 
in this paragraph. The self-construct in psychodynamic theory may be interpreted as 
'autonomous ego functions' or intrapsychic ways of regaining emotional equanim.ity, for 
example, to self-soothe or self-calm (Kohut, 1971, 1977). According to this theory, a 
value is placed on achieving emotional equanimity independently as referred to by the 
expression of the 'self-contained' individual. This involves not seeing others as 
extensions of oneself to magically know and fulfill needs, not to use others in a 
nonverbal, indirect way to get these met and not to use others for the vicarious 
expression of 'wants' or opinions. It involves taking responsibility for getting emotional 
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needs met (Haase, 1993) and taking responsibility for the convictions, beliefs, opinions, 
and wants that one has. The 'self construct that one is theorised to become in 
psychodynamic theory is the 'aware self, or the self that knows about, and accepts a 
priori unconscious motivations, undesirable "r undeveloped tendencies (Jung, 1959). 
The 'self construct in psychodynamic theory may also be interpreted as the agentic 
'self or the 'self that initiates responses or actions and does not simply react to the 
processes of the relational domain or conform to the dictates of the group. 
This paragraph will address what role the notion of culture is theorised to have on 
this psychodynamic conceptualisation of 'self. From the above description, the 'self 
conceptualised in psychodynamic theory (Kohut, 1971, 1977) can be said to fall into 
the category of 'sense-of-self outlined earlier. By this, what is meant is that 
psychodynamic theory theorises largely in terms of nonverbal awarenesses and states. 
Hence, the role of culture can be said not to feature in psychodynamic theory, as these 
fundamental, preverbal awarenesses are regarded by psychodynamic theory as being 
universal. 
However, as discussed in the previous section on the systemic conceptualisation of 
'self, culture (meaning collective or individualist cultures) can be said to influence the 
very nonverbal emotional-relational milieu in which these ego functions are seen to 
develop in psychodynamic theory. Hence, one notes the very sharp contrast between 
the interdependent we-self of collectivist culture, which captures all the features 
deemed to be maladaptive in psychodynamic theory, and the self-contained, 
independent 'self of individualist culture. In terms of psychodynamic norm~tive criteria 
the 'we-self can be said to be the 'fused-self vicariously using others as extensions of 
oneself. Hence, although not included in psychodynamic theory, 'culture' can be said 
to influence the conceptualisation of 'self. 
The conceptualisation of 'self, from a feminist perspective, will be addressed in this 
paragraph. Feminist theorising about the 'self has largely been in reaction to what they 
call a Western conceptualisation of 'self as independent, assertive, masterful, which 
they contend reflects masculine values (Jordan, 1991; Josselson, 1988). Surrey (1991, 
p. 152) puts forward a "self-in-relation-model" which involves the recognition that for 
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women, the primary experience of the 'self is relational, that is, the 'self is organised 
and developed within the context of important relationships. This may mean that, for 
example, such individualist notions of sense-of-self, self-esteem, and individuality are 
embedded in the relationship. In other wordt;, this may mean that these notions arise 
out of, and depend upon the interactions that occur between people. Miller ( 1991, p. 
13) uses the term "being-in-relation" to describe the sense-of-self. It is an internal 
representation of the 'self inseparable from dynamic interaction. At the heart of this 
dynamic interaction is the attending to each other's mental states and emotions. Thus, 
this sense of 'self is of someone who attends to, and responds to what is going on in 
the relationship between two or more people. In feminist theory, self-esteem is 
dependent on the felt ability to make and then to maintain affiliations and relationships 
(Surrey, 1991 ). This idea of ''taking care of relationships" (Miller, 1991, p. 16) involves 
good-enough understanding of the other in a sense of mutual concern for the 
well-being of each other. For Josselson (1987), in feminist theory, nurturing 
connectedness is in itself a form of self-expression, self-assertion and individuality. 
Hence, it can be said that the self-construct in feminist theory is described in terms of 
the notion of self-concept in that it involves reflecting on experiences in relating, and 
forming mental representations of those. 
This paragraph will address what role the notion of culture is theorised to have on 
the feminist conceptualisation of self. Of relevance here, is the idea that culture 
influences one's self-concept. Various authors have explored the nature of this 
influence (Goldschmidt, 1995; Kashima, Kim, Gelfand, Yamaguchi, Choi, & Yuki, 1995; 
Lo Verso, 1995). For example, Kashima et al. (1995) showed how culture influences 
how one sees oneself along the dimensions of independent versus interdependent, 
agentic versus communal and separate versus relational. Feminist theory proposes 
that culture (as prescribing an agentic, autonomous, independent self), has a devaluing. 
impact on one's personal self-concept of "self-in-relation" (Surrey, 1991, p. 152). 
Feminist writers, for example, Miller (1976), Nelson ( 1996), Gilligan ( 1982), have 
expressed some vocalisation in relation to this. This vocalisation can be seen to be an 
influence of the individual on the culture via social discourse practices. This can be 
said to illustrate Goldschmidt's (1995) comment that the influence of culture on how one 
sees oneself is not simply a unidirectional process. Tang (1992) makes a comment 
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that in collectivist societies where the socio-cultural self-construct is an interdependent, 
relational we-self, the individual's personal self-concept may be notably individualistic. 
This may be interpreted as illustrating Goldschmidt's (1995) comment. 
• 
The Notion of Culture in Postmodern, Western Theories on Individuation 
Three conceptualisations will be addressed, namely: self as empty, self as narrative 
and self as saturated. 
Postmodern thought [Cerullo (1992); Fogel (1993); Gergen (1984, 1985, 1991a, 
1994); Gergen and Gergen (1988); Greenberg (1995); Harre (1983, 1991 ); Hermans, 
Kempen, & Van Loon (1992); Hermans, Rijks & Kempen (1993); Miller, Potts, Fung, 
Hoogstra, & Mintz (1990); O'Hara & Anderson (1991); Penn & Frankfurt (1994); 
Rappaport (1993); Rosenbaum & Dyckman (1995); Sarup (1993); Singer (1995); 
Varella, Thompson, & Rosch (1991 )] distinguishes between experience and reflection. 
According to Varela et al. (1991 ), we experience a sense of self that is continuous, 
stable, in a sense, the essence of our psychic survival. It is this sense of self that we 
want to defend or enhance and is linked to the losses and pains we experience. Yet, 
when self-reflecting on immediate experience, Varela et al. (1991 ), state that meditators 
find a flux of transitory experiential states, for example, bodily sensations, perceptions, 
feelings, impulses, thoughts. 
Yet, meditators experience no separate self independent of this flux of experiential 
states. Varela et al. (1991, p. 63) put forward this central dilemma: "if there is no 
experienced self, then how is it that we think there is? ... What is it in experience that 
we take for a self?" As a basis for logical analysis, Varela et al. (1991) use the 
Abhidharma (one of the divisions of the Buddhist canon) to put forward five aggregates. 
of experience. According to this canon these are: forms, feelings/sensations, 
perceptions (discernments), impulses, dispositional formations, consciousness. Varela 
et al. (1991) elaborate on each area to discern in which category of experience can one 
equate this experience of a continuous self. Varela et al. ( 1991) conclude that one 
cannot equate self with one's body, feelings, perceptions, personality traits (habits, 
motives, emotions) or consciousness, either because one experiences a separate I 
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who, for example, has a body or has feelings, or, because of the disunity of any 
particular experiential category. 
Varela et al. (1991) conclude then that although one can discern many components 
of experience, for example, motivations, dispositions, volitions and awareness of 
various forms, one cannot discern anything that may be identified as this fundamental, 
continuous, coherent self. They conclude that this flux of experience cannot "be pinned 
down" and thus it is "empty of a self' (p. 80). The self that we believe to exist as some 
permanent, stable, continuous entity is an expression of an "habitual clinging" (p. 80) 
to any one or combination of these aggregates of experience, and as such the self is 
just another transitory component in the flux of experience. According to Wilber's 
(1985) thinking, this transitory component in experience that we cling to as 'self is 
simply a collection of memories that is felt to be separate from present experience, 
hence existing as an observing I. According to Varela et al. (1991 ), following Buddhist 
thought, the tendency to imbue this experience of self as, for example, permanent and 
fundamental is thus illusionary. 
Epstein (1992) provides further ideas on the 'empty self concept. Epstein's (1992, 
p. 52) "egolessness" or "selflessness" is used instead of the term 'empty self. For 
Epstein (1992), selflessness does not refer to regressive states (in traditional thought) 
in which there are no constraints on primitive impulses and where unrestrained 
expression occurs; nor does it refer to (in traditional thought) fusion or merger 
experiences where a sense of separateness from one's surroundings (social or 
physical) is lost. Instead the ego, or (in Epstein's understanding) the ongoing flux of 
experiential states - feelings, thoughts, bodily sensations, is retained. Selflessness, for 
Epstein (1992, p. 52), is the negation of "the actual internal experience of one's self' 
as "inherently existing". This involves identifying and negating the ways in which we . 
believe we inherently exist. For Epstein (1992), selflessness does not involve negating 
something which actually exists but recognising its nonexistence in the way we 
imagined it to be. This involves, for example, appreciating that thoughts exist without 
a thinker, feelings without a feeler and so on (Epstein, 1992). 
An implication of this empty-self conceptualisation is that we no longer come to know 
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self through reified, linguistic categories derived from reflections on past experience, 
but we come to know self in the immediacy of ongoing experience (Rosenbaum & 
Dyckman, 1995). Thus, one's self is not, for example, our beliefs, feelings, etcetera, 
but the potentialities inherent in dispositioflls or capacities to perceive, think, feel or 
believe (Rosenbaum & Dyckman, 1995). According to the empty-self 
conceptualisation, the very self one believes that one has grasped is constantly 
changing, hence the idea of 'empty self. Thus it can be said that there is no a priori 
conceptualisation of self. The idea of self-knowledge may thus be interpreted as simple 
awareness of the ongoing flux of changing perceptions, thoughts, feelings. This 
conceptualisation of self may be described by the term 'sense-of-self since a 
nonverbal, non-self-reflective stance is proposed. Hence, the notion of culture as 
social discourse is not seen to feature much because the intermediatory process of 
verbal self-reflection through which culture may be seen to impact, is not incorporated 
in the notion of sense-of-self. 
In the following discussion, the postmodern conceptualisation of self as narrative will 
be addressed as well as the role of culture in this conceptualisation. 
Harre (1991) discusses the traditional and postmodern conceptualisations of 'self 
or personhood. He puts forward two terms which he subsequently uses in this 
discussion: Self-1 refers to the common understanding of personal identity, and Self-2 
refers to our various roles in social interactions. Harre's (1991) distinction between 
Self-1 and Self-2 can be said to be parallel to Hermans, Rijks, and Kempen's (1993, p. 
211) distinction between "I as author and me as actor". In other words, according to 
Hermans et al. (1995), 'I' refers to that 'part' of ourselves that makes sense of our 
interactions. It may be interpreted as the self-reflective or 'observing I', whereas 'me' 
may be interpreted as our momentary experience in social interaction. Harre { 1991). 
discusses 'self from two perspectives: ontology or the existence or nature/essence of 
'self and epistemology or how we come to know this 'self. 
According to Harre (1991) for traditionalists, Self-1 exists as some unknowable, 
spiritual essence. In traditional thought, there is no Self-2 because we are what we are 
whether we are self-reflecting about experience or interacting with others. 
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In terms of postmodern thinking, Self-2 refers to various social selves that arise out 
of various interactional experiences and are contextually contingent. According to 
Harre ( 1991 ), Self-1 in postmodern thought is not an a priori given but is an emergent 
property. Self-1 arises when we organise e.xperience. 
A question to be posed is: What may be meant by organising experience and what 
kind of relationship can be seen to exist between culture and organising experience or 
culture and the 'components' of 'self? 
To summarise the following discussion, three ways by which experience may be 
interpreted to be organised will be described: Firstly, by building up "expectancies" 
(Beebe & Lachmann, 1988, p. 20) of what occurs in a relational pattern; secondly, by 
one's "epistemology" (Bateson, 1979, p. 12) and thirdly, by constructing a narrative of 
one's life's events (Gergen & Gergen, 1988). The focus of this discussion will be: how 
does, or to what extent, is culture theorised to influence the organising of experience 
which involves the building up of expectancies, one's epistemology, and the 
construction of a narrative? Or, in other words, what role is the notion of culture 
theorised to have on this postmodern conceptualisation of self? 
One way of describing how experience may be interpreted to be organised will be 
addressed in the following paragraphs. 
Beebe and Lachmann (1988) attempt to answer the question of how the infant 
organises experience. They say that this is done via patterns of interaction where 
there is mutual influence between mother and infant. The infant organises experience 
by learning that certain actions give rise to certain responses. Thus, the idea of 
organising experience involves making sense, or forming some order out o~ one's 
experiential world. 
According to Beebe and Lachmann (1988), the infant forms mental images of 
interactional patterns - hence the emphasis is on the relationship and the behaviours 
that happen. When the infant forms a mental image of an interactional pattern, he/she 
also forms a mental image of what response to expect from his/her mother when a 
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certain action is performed. In this way, the infant develops expectancies as well as 
a sense of initiative (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988) thus bringing organisation to his/her 
experience. 
• 
These interactional patterns are also theorised to organise the infant's experience 
on an emotional level. According to Beebe and Lachmann (1988), the infant forms an 
expectation of being matched and being able to match the caregiver. By matching, 
Beebe and Lachmann (1988) refer to the timely copying of behavioural responses. By 
copying the behavioural response, the corresponding psychophysiological experience 
is also copied. Thus, the infant develops the expectancy that he/she can copy the 
other's gestures and so participate in the other's experience. He/she also develops the 
expectancy that the others can copy his/her gestures and so share in his/her 
experience. 
Bateson's (1979, p. 12) notion of "epistemology" may be interpreted as another way 
by which the organisation of experience takes place. 
This paragraph will address how the notion of epistemology may be interpreted as 
being involved in the organisation of experience. For Bateson (1991 ), the concept of 
self may be described as the reciprocal relationship between how one perceives or 
interprets the world and the interactional behaviour that follows. Bateson (1979, p. 
147) calls this process "learning II". Bateson ( 1991, p. 206) placed much emphasis on 
what he calls "unconscious presuppositions" ... or the how of using one's senses, or 
one's epistemology. For Bateson ( 1991 ), it is these unconscious presuppositions that 
undergird how one interprets the world and by reciprocal relation, how one interacts 
with it. 
Thus, to summarise, 'expectancies', and 'epistemology' may be interpreted as ways 
of organising experience. Thus 'expectancies' and 'epistemology' can be said to 
constitute the 'self or components of the 'self. 
However, in terms of Bateson's (1979) thinking, to describe epistemology as a 
component of 'self is a misnomer since 'self is not seen as a structure but a process 
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between one's epistemology and the interactional behaviour that reciprocally follows. 
Nonetheless, for the purposes of easy description, expectancies, and epistemology 
will be discussed as ways of organising e,.,:>erience and thus as components of the 
'self. 
The next question to be addressed is: how are ways of organising experience 
theorised to be influenced by culture? Learning expectancies is theorised to be one 
way of organising experience (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988). Learning expectancies 
occurs via interactional patterns (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988). Thus, the above question 
may be rephrased as: how is culture theorised to influence interactional patterns? 
Fogel's (1993) theorising will be used to address how culture is theorised to 
influence interactional patterns. 
However, first an interpretation of what Fogel (1993) may mean by the term culture 
needs to be given. According to Fogel (1993), culture defines the type of discourse 
possible between individuals, for example, who talks to whom, and what is discussed. 
Culture also defines the nature of the communicational exchange itself because culture 
provides the tools for communication, for example, language, symbols, gestures. The 
expansive variety of personal pronouns in the Japanese language, allowing for a 
multitude of different social relations to be represented, may be seen as an illustration 
of the idea that culture provides the tools for communication. The existence of 
particular emotional states typical in some cultures and not others because of the 
emotional state's symbolic representations in some language systems and not others, 
for example "liget" (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996, p. 236), in llongot culture, may be seen 
as another illustration. The system of naming infants in Balinese culture accorcjing to 
group membership rather than individual identity (Gergen, 1991 b) may be seen as a 
third illustration. Hence, it may be concluded that culture, according to the above 
description, refers to norms and the symbolic communicational system. 
The following paragraphs will address the question of how 'culture' is theorised to 
influence interactional patterns. 
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Fogel (1993) proposes a tight interdependence between the concepts of self, 
communication, and culture. According to Fogel (1993, p. 16), each is a facet of the 
developing individual, "each facet defines the other and each facet creates the other" . 
• 
For Fogel (1993), self emerges out of coordinated communicational exchanges - the 
communicational exchange itself occurring via the use of a cultural symbolic system. 
For Fogel ( 1993, p. 146) 'self only exists in comparison and the basis for this 
comparison are "co-regulated relationships". Fogel (1993) describes the phrase 'self 
only exists in comparison' by discussing a preverbal communicational exchange 
involving mother pulling infant from a laying to a sitting position. According to Fogel 
(1993), the infant becomes aware of a physical sense-of-self when there is difference 
in the muscular exertion between him/her and his/her mother. Because there is 
difference, he/she becomes aware of those parts of the physical exertion under his 
control and those that are not. Hence, he/she becomes aware of a physical sense of 
self (Fogel, 1993). Hence, the sense of self emerges out of (by comparison), but is 
also embedded in the relationship. And the process of 'emerging out of and 'being 
imbedded in' happens via the use of cultural symbols. Hence, culture may be 
interpreted to influence interactional patterns by providing the very means by which this 
communication takes place, and it is through communication that one organises 
experience or constructs 'self via the 'building up' of expectancies or epistemology. 
The third way by which experiences may be interpreted to be organised and the 'self 
constructed, is through the construction of a narrative (Gergen & Gergen, 1988; 
Greenberg, 1995; Harre, 1991; Hermans, Kempen, & Van Loon, 1992; Hermans, Rijks, 
& Kempen, 1993; Miller, Potts, Fung, Hoogstra, & Mintz, 1990; Singer, 1995). 
What will follow will be a discussion of the postmodern conceptualisation of self as 
narrative and how culture is theorised to be involved in this conceptualisation. (In the 
following few paragraphs, the term social constructionism will be used interchangeably 
with the term postmodern.) 
In terms of social constructionist thinking (Gergen & Gergen, 1988) and 
commentaries on constructionist thinking (Greenberg 1995, Hoskins & Leseho 1996), 
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"we make ourselves by telling stories about ourselves" (Greenberg, 1995, p. 271 ). 
Telling stories about ourselves involves linking the events in our lives in some 
meaningful way. In other words, it involves finding answers to questions such as 'why 
did this happen in relation to that?' Culture, or societal norms, evaluative standards, 
ideologies, prevailing practices, cultural myths, may be interpreted as influencing this 
process on two levels. 
First, culture is said to influence the choices we make and thus the actual events that 
happen in our lives (Greenberg, 1995). Secondly, culture is said to influence how we 
find reasons for what happens in our lives (Gergen & Gergen, 1988), or link events 
together in such a way so as to give rise to self-concepts commonly understood as 
personal qualities or traits. According to Gergen and Gergen (1988), we are not alone 
in this drama since the events that happen in our lives happen in relation to other 
people. Thus, it may be interpreted that our relationships with others also influence the 
reasons we give to these events as well as how we link these in some meaningful way. 
To address the statement that culture provides reasons for events that happen in our 
lives (Gergen & Gergen, 1988), a definition of culture in social constructionist thought 
needs to be given. 
According to Wetherell and Maybin (1996, p. 248), culture is defined as "the 
negotiation and provisional realisation of beliefs and values through ongoing 
interactions and practices". In short, culture may be interpreted as social interaction 
and discourse practices, for example: moral, legal, traditional. Thus culture may be 
regarded as providing the medium by which we find links for events in our lives. When 
links are found for isolated events, stories are constructed and reconstructed. By the 
term 'medium', what is meant is that traditional understandings or cultural myths help 
one to make sense of isolated events. Sometimes stories can be said to have religious 
significance and sometimes they can be said to be more personal. Examples of stories 
can be said to be: that good emerges or can be found in suffering or pain, and that 
everything has a purpose and place in the mystery of life. However, in social 
constructionist thought, the influence of culture is not unidimensional by which some 
rigid processing of fitting experiences into culturally determined, meaning-giving 
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frameworks takes place. 
These, what can be called culturally-determined frameworks or stories, are the 
products of discourse (the talk and texts of .social life - Wetherell & Maybin, 1996, p. 
240), hence are open to modification in communicational exchange. Thus totally new 
and idiosyncratic stories may be constructed from the events that happen in one's life. 
In other words, totally new and idiosyncratic frameworks may be formed from the events 
themselves, rather than the frameworks simply being a structure into which the events 
of one's life are fitted. 
Hence the importance of relationships in social constructionist thought. 
Relationships allow for different forms of communicational exchanges which perturb 
and modify existing ideas thus giving rise to new ideas, new stories and thus new ways 
of making sense of significant life events. 
In this conceptualisation of self as narrative, 'culture' is theorised to have an 
influence on the formation of one's self-concept or how one constructs a story about 
oneself. A comment is that in postmodern thought, there is no a priori 'self that one 
tries to become, one is always becoming in the cultural domain of social discourse, in 
the continual process of constructing and deconstructing how one thinks about oneself 
in the various relational domains one experiences. 
The third postmodern conceptualisation of self, namely, the "satured self' (Gergen, 
1991 b, p. 7) will be discussed subsequently. The "saturated self' concept refers to the 
notion of "self as relatedness" (Gergen, 1991 b, p. 139). According to Gergen (1991 b) 
the notion of self as a separate, authentic, single, and knowable essence gives way to 
the notion of self as embodied in the many social roles one comes to assume. 1-:fence,. 
"one's identity is continuously emergent, reformed and redirected as one moves 
through the sea of everchanging relationships" (p. 139), one's identity is thus only 
"permitted by the social rituals of which one is part" (p. 157). In other words, the self 
one constructs or the impression one gives is defined as real by the social processes 
which issue in, and determine the fate of this self-construction (Gergen, 1991 b). 
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The following will address the role of culture in this conceptualisation of self as 
saturated. Gergen (1991 b) gives a broad description of the role of culture in the 
shifting conceptualisations of self. He uses the term 'culture' to refer to, for example, 
lifestyles, communicational networks, cultural.artefacts. Gergen (1991b) uses the terms 
romantic, modern, and postmodern to refer to different cultural periods and gives a 
broad description of how culture influences one's experience of oneself in daily living 
and reciprocally how this experience is conceptualised in the social discourse practices 
of that period. This is outlined as follows: Gergen (1991 b, p. 27) describes the 
romantic cultural period as one in which love was placed "in the forefront of human 
endeavours" and a belief in the "deep dynamics of personality" was held. In 
conceptualising the self, emphasis was placed on the unseen, inner depths of the 
person. It was held that the person embodied a kind of sacredness, which gave value 
to the individual and to the relationships he/she, became involved in. Coupled to this 
was a sense of the unknown, the mysterious, where intuition, mysticism, inspiration, 
creativity, passion, depth, and purpose characterised the world of persons. 
According to Gergen (1991 b), with the rise of the modern period came an emphasis 
on empirical observation and functional utility. People were seen as self-contained, 
autonomous, and knowable, having machine-like essences that could be fathomed 
through techniques of rational inquiry. 
Gergen (1991 b, p. 48) describes the postmodern period by the term "social 
saturation" which he refers to as the chaotic and multitudinous bombardment of social 
stimuli - communicational obligations, relational commitment, activities, interests 
beckoning attention. Gergen (1991 b) describes this cultural influence as having two 
effects on the experience of oneself in daily living. The first effect Gergen (1991 b, p. 
69) calls "populating of the self' or the acquisition of different and multiple potentials. 
for being. This involves the situation that while one may know and feel secure with a 
sense of coherent identity or self-sameness, one may suddenly have the experience 
of being someone different-contradicting this sense of coherence. The second effect 
Gergen (1991 b, p. 72) calls "multiphrenia" or the process of getting drawn into, and 
becoming invested in so many different directions and pursuits (all of which have equal 
validity or reality). 
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Gergen (1991 b) describes in more detail the effects of "populating of the self' (p. 69) 
and "multiphrenia" (p. 72) on one's experience in daily living as follows: First what is 
involved is a playing of varied and sometimes contradictory social roles so as to meet 
the varied demands of the many relationships one finds oneself involved in. As one 
searches for appropriate forms of action, one's identity is likely to be questioned rather 
than confirmed, thus giving rise to a heightened sense of "playing a role" or "managing 
impressions" (p. 145), and an erosion of a sense of security that an essential, unified 
self brings. In terms of the relational domain, actions seem less sincere and more 
instrumental. Slowly it becomes increasingly difficult to recall to what core essence one 
must remain true, and instead one simply acts to full potential in the moment at hand 
(Gergen, 1991 b). This sense of superficiality gives way to an optimistic sense of 
enormous possibility until the distinction between image or presentation and real, true 
self diminishes in accord with the emergence of a culture of multiple, equally valid 
realities. 
According to Gergen ( 1991 b ), these processes of "populating of the self (p. 69) and 
"multiphrenia" (p. 72) have the following effect on the social discourse practices of the 
self, namely: that the single knowable, authentic self becomes deconstructed giving rise 
to the construction of self as existing in social role. 
To conclude: when the notion of self is conceptualised in terms of sense-of-self, for 
example, from the psychodynamic perspective, and by the empty self theorists, the 
notion of culture can be said to feature minimally in such theorising. In contrast, it can 
be said that the theoretical perspectives conceptualising self as self-concept, for 
example, the feminist perspective and the narrative, post-modern theories include the 
notion of culture, variously defined. Self-concept, as involving a self-reflexive verbal 
stance, can be said to require the idea of a linguistic system, hence the inclusion of 
culture (as linguistic system) in these conceptualisations of self. 
A more general conclusion, is that these theorists describe a relationship between 
the notion of culture (variously defined) and a static sub-construct, for example, 'self 
or 'self-concept', of the individuation construct. 
\ 
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These sub-constructs can be said to be 'static' because 'self can be said to be 
variously conceptualised as, for example, emotional, cognitive and communicational 
capacities, perceptions, awarenesses, expectancies, epistemologies, cognitions 
(stories). It can be said that none of these theories use a dynamic sub-construct (e.g. 
behaviour) of the individuation construct when theorising about the role of 'culture' in 
theories on individuation. Hence, the following sections will attempt to address the 
question: can a relationship be seen to exist between the socio-cultural context2 and 
the process of self-expression (or individualist behaviour)? The following sections will 
also attempt to address the following: can self-expression be seen to occur in a way, 
other than by opposing public opinion if public opinion goes contrary to one's wishes, 
goals, pursuits? 
A Discussion of Jung's Theory of Individuation 
One of the primary foci of this section is to address the question: can self-expression 
be seen to occur in a way other than by opposing public opinion? This question was 
arrived at in order to find a way of resolving the experiential tension between 
individuality and group acceptance. A discussion of Jung's (1959) theory on 
individuation was deemed necessary because the individuality versus group 
acceptance tension may be interpreted to be at the heart of his theory on individuation. 
It was thought that by exploring Jung's (1959) theory on individuation, a way of 
resolving the individuality versus group acceptance tension would be found, as well as 
gaining an understanding of what individuation can be said to entail according to Jung's 
(1959) theory. 
A Brief Definition of Jung's (1959) Construct of Individuation 
For Jung (1959, p.17 4) "individuation involves divest(ing) the self of the false 
wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and of the suggestive power of primordial 
2 In this discussion, the following terms will be used interchangeably: societal prescriptions, socio-
cultural context, cultural discourse practices, cultural dictates, societal norms, culture. Unless 
otherwise defined, these terms will be used to refer to authoritatively defined, circumscribed shared 
understandings, typical expectations or common knowledge. The socio-cultural self-construct will 
be used interchangeably with Jacobi's ( 1976, p. 42) "collective ideal" to refer to a narrow subset of 
cultural discourse practice, namely: what society prescribes to be the ideal 'self. 
23 
images on the other". Elsewhere, Jung (1959, p. 275) says "individuation (is used) to 
denote the process by which a person becomes a psychological individual, that is, a 
separate, indivisible unity or whole". Jung (1959, p. 273) defines "individuality" as 
"embracing our innermost, last, incomparable uniqueness, (which) implies becoming 
one's own self'. 
A Brief Discussion of the Terms "Ego". "Persona". "Self' 
Jung (1959) defines the ego as follows: "a complex of ideas which constitutes the 
centre of my field of consciousness and appears to possess a high degree of continuity 
and identity" (p. 425). Elsewhere, Jung (1959, p. 5) uses ego to describe "conscious 
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personality". According to Hopche (1989) by ego, Jung meant our self-concept - what 
one would refer to by the expression: "Gee, I wasn't myself last night" (p. 77). The ego 
can be understood to refer to individual needs, wants, wishes, opinions which would 
be referred to by the terms: 'self-expression' or 'self-assertion'. This is in contrast to 
narcissism or what is commonly regarded as selfish in layman's terms. Jung (1959) 
calls narcissism individualism - the uncompromising and exaggerated fulfilment of 
selfish desires and wishes. Jung (1959, p. 557) uses the term "ego-personality" to refer 
to a sense of 1-ness. Thus, in this section, the term 'self will be used interchangeably 
with 'ego', and will refer to ideas of individuality, 1-ness, or self-expression. This is in 
contrast to Jung's (1959, p. 460) term: Self which will be explained subsequently. 
Jung (1959, p. 464) defines the persona as the "mask" that is, "the ad hoc adopted 
attitude" by which the individual adjusts his/her "social aims and aspirations" to the 
; 
"social conditions and requirements". Jung (1959, p. 465) says that "the persona is 
exclusively concerned with the relation to objects". By this Jung may mean that the 
"persona" is outwardly directed - a form of relating that comes from an adaptation .to the. 
outside world rather than towards an adaptation to one's inner psychic life. Jacobi 
(1976) talks about the persona as a necessary outcome of good upbringing or societal 
adjustment. 
In contrast to the term self, Jung (1959) used the term Self to refer to an archetype 
of wholeness, meaning an inherent, primordial, universal tendency to bring into 
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consciousness certain instinctual patterns of behaviour which the individual formerly 
found difficult to understand or control. These "inherent tendencies" (Jung, 1959, p. 
228) "patterns of instinctual behaviour" or "universal images", Jung (1959, p. 44) called 
"archetypes". Thus the Self archetype may be regarded as the overriding tendency to 
bring other archetypes (tendencies), (which have an unknown yet controlling influence 
on the individual) into awareness. 
For Jung (1959) greater consciousness or becoming whole is an intrapsychic 
process which affects the collective (group or society) because when we become aware 
of unconscious impulses or images, we do not need others to be repositories of that 
which is difficult to accept abo~t ourselves, be it, for example, negative attributions 
and/or feelings. Thus when we become more aware of universal archetypes (which can 
be called individual development) we have greater freedom to act in relation to these 
tendencies in response to others (collective development). Hence Jung (1959, p. 147) 
describes the individual as "not merely a unique and separate being but is also a social 
being". However, elsewhere Jung (1959, p. 174) describes the individual as 
"composed of purely universal factors, he is wholly collective". One could interpret this 
to mean that when one becomes aware of unconscious, undesirable or underdeveloped 
tendencies, one ceases to see only others as possessing them. This promotes greater 
solidarity with others because we see in ourselves what we formerly only saw in others. 
Also, it can be said that this expanding of consciousness brings the individual into 
communion with the world at large to such an extent that egotistic wishes, fears, hopes 
and ambitions are subordinated to difficulties that concern humanity as a whole. 
According to Jacobi (1965), Jung uses the concept of 'Self to refer to the motive goal 
and means of achieving individuation. By motive, Jung (1959) uses 'Self to refer to a 
universal, fundamental teleology. The goal is often referred to by Jung (1959) as a. 
state of dialectical relation between one's self-concept (ego) and one's unconscious. 
According to Jung (1959), the ego is the only aspect of the Self which we know, 
therefore, the more we come to know about ourselves, the more individuated we 
become. However, Jung (1959) postulates that the Self will never be completely 
knowable, hence according to Jungian theory, it is the ongoing, dialectical relationship 
between the known and the unknown of ourselves that is at the heart of the 
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individuation process. 
Qualities that are unacknowledged are regarded as 'opposites' to that which we are 
consciously aware of, therefore this state ofadynamic tension is also often referred to 
as the union of opposites or the integration of the shadow. Thus 'Self as metaphor of 
the means of individuation can be said to refer to this dynamic tension between the 
known and unknown or the process of uniting the opposites. 
Sometimes Jung (1959) uses 'Self as a statidstructural metaphor to refer to this goal 
of uniting the opposites. According to Jung (1959, p. 460) "the Self designates the 
whole range of psychic phenomena in man. It expresses the unity of the personality 
as a whole". Elsewhere, Jung (1959, p. 236) says the Self is used as a metaphor for 
an "unknowable essence" or "God within us". Jacobi (1965) refers to the Self as "the 
unconscious substrate" {p. 49), "the structural element of the psyche" (p. 50), or "the 
primal, unfathomable ground of the psyche" (p. 132). 
A Broader Description of Jung's (1959) Theory of Individuation 
From some of Jung's writings, he appears to be setting the individual in opposition 
to the collective by his concept of individuation (e.g., Jung. 1940, 1959). Jung (1959, 
p. 451) says that "individuation cuts one off from personal conformity and hence from 
collectivity". This may mean that detachment from any external collective ties is 
necessary for the sake of focussing on one's inner psychic life of expanding 
consciousness. However, Jung (1959, p. 451) elaborates by stating that the individual 
"must bring forth values to compensate for his absence in the collective personal 
sphere". Jung (1940) appears to be saying that it is through the individual's vocation 
that these values are brought forth, from which flows collective development, and that. 
one finds one's vocation as an outcome of coming to know oneself. 
Thus Jung's concept of individuation can be seen to comprise two major ideas: 
Firstly: adaptation of the individual to society by the development of the persona. 
Secondly: becoming whole, which embraces the two aspects of Jung's definition of 
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individuation namely: "Divesting the Self of the false wrappings of the persona" (Jung, 
1959, p. 174) and "Becoming one's own Self' (p. 173). 
Divesting the Self of the false wrappings of the persona involves coming to 
realise and move crway from the unquestioning fulfilment of public opinion, conventions, 
role expectations, to avoid being "carried by society" (Jung, 1959, p. 240). It can be 
said that this involves the development of those qualities not prescribed or lauded by 
the group or society. 
For Jung (1959, p. 173), becoming one's own Self, does not imply the unlimited or 
most authentic expression or development of selfish needs or wishes, what Jung (1959) 
calls individualism, but expanding consciousness or fulfilling the archetype of the Self. 
Becoming one's own 'self can be seen to embrace two facets namely: becoming more 
aware of unconscious tendencies and seeing in ourselves what we would rather not 
see. Jung (1959), describes an analytical process by which one is proposed to become 
more aware of unconscious tendencies, impulses, attitudes. This involves the process 
by which symbols or images from, for example, dreams become personified or attain 
rational meaning and so are integrated into consciousness when their meaning is 
experienced on an emotional level. Seeing in ourselves what we would rather not see 
involves a process called withdrawing projections. When projections are withdrawn, 
interactions with the environment can occur in a less automatic way and with greater 
solidarity to others. 
Thus, in short, Jung's definition of individuation may be interpreted as involving 
coming to know oneself and express oneself even in the face of opposing public 
opinion. 
The resolution of the individuality (self-expression) versus group acceptance tension 
to be drawn from Jung's (1959) writing may be interpreted to involve ensuring 
individuality even at the expense of losing group acceptance. Hence, a point of enquiry 
arose: can self-expression (individuality) be seen to occur in another way, other than 
by opposing public opinion, if public opinion contrasts with one's wishes, goals, 
pursuits. In other words, it was intended to find a way of self-expression which would 
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preserve both poles of the individuality versus group acceptance tension. This will be 
taken up further in the section: can self-expression be seen to occur in a way other than 
by opposing public opinion? 
'Self as a Socio-Cultural Construct 
In order to address the question: can a relationship be seen to exist between 
self-expression and the socio-cultural context, the following needs to be done. The 
presumed relationship between self-expression and an individualist culture3, needs to 
be compared with the presumed relationship between self-expression and a collectivist 
culture. What is relevant here, is what kind of self society prescribes or constructs, 
or what is regarded as the "collective ideal" (Jacobi, 1965, p. 42) in individualist and 
collectivist cultures. Hence, a discussion of the socio-cultural self-construct of 
individualist and collectivist cultures needs to be given. 
There have been various motivations for theorists to think differently about the 
traditional notion of self as universal, separate, singular entity. For example, on a 
practical level, for Hsu (1985}, such a conceptualisation of self is irrelevant because 
it reflects, in theory, the Western ideal of individuality but does not reflect how the 
individual lives in a Western culture, far less any individual in any culture. In a similar 
vein, numerous authors have suggested that an adequate understanding of the 
individual requires that one understand him/her in his/her particular socio-cultural and 
cosmological context (Murphy, 1981; Pari, Morgenthaler & Pari-Matthey, 1980; Sow, 
1977, 1980; in Alt, 1988). From another angle Shweder and Bourne (1984) discuss a 
number of anthropological studies of various cultures in which the person is not 
considered an individual in his/her own right. A comment they make is that in some 
cultures the individual has no intrinsic moral value apart from the social status and. 
3 The term Western culture will be used interchangeably with the term 'individualist culture', and the 
term 'collectivist culture' will be used interchangeably with the term Eastern (Japanese or Indian), or 
African cultures. The term 'individualist culture' will be used to refer to a social grouping in which the 
discourse practices prescribe autonomy, independence. agency. Ryan's (1991, p. 225) definition 
of autonomy and independence will be used. For Ryan (1991, p. 225) ·autonomy represents a 
subjective sense of endorsement, volition and self-direction in one's action. In contrast, the issue of 
independence is most adequately defined as self-reliance - not depending on resources from 
another·. Agency can be said to refer to the ability to be proactive, to take initiative. The term 
'collectivist culture' will be used to refer to a social grouping in which the discourse practices prescribe 
interdependence, connectivity, mutuality and reciprocity. 
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situation in which he finds himself. They contrast this with the western cultural context 
in which the person's moral responsibility transcends his/her social context. They use 
Geerty's (1975 in Shweder & Bourne, 1984, p. 167) quote to put forward an opinion. 
Geerty asserts that "the Western conception Qf the person as a bounded, unique, more 
or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, 
emotion, judgement and action organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively 
both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, 
however, incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the 
world's cultures". In a similar vein, for Markus and Kitayama (1991) various proverbial 
anecdotes or ritual practices in collectivist and individualist cultures suggested to them 
that people in these different cultures hold different ideas about the nature of self, 
others and the interdependence between the two. They suggest that these varying 
construals which they define broadly as the "independent" and "interdependent" 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991, p. 230) construals influence certain features such as 
cognition, emotion and motivation. Hence, the idea of 'self as being a socio-cultural 
construct rather than an acultural, separate and singular entity has been reflected in 
the literature (Carrithers, Collins, & Lukes, 1985; De Craemer, 1983; Florsheim, 1990; 
Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Marsella, De Vos, & Hsu, 1985; Shweder & Bourne, 1984). 
What will follow will be a discussion of how the self is constructed in Collectivist 
(Eastern and African) and Individualist cultures. 
Self-Construct in Collectivist Cultures 
Self-Construct in Eastern Cultures 
In Eastern cultures, theorists talk about an "interdependent construal of self' (Markus 
& Kitayama, 1991, p. 227) or a "we-self' (Collins & Dasai in Roland, 1988, p. 8). This 
construct is used to describe a 'self-in-relation-to-other', in which the role of the other 
is more important in defining the "self' than in cultures which have an independent 
construal of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991 ). In this way, relationships become the 
primary self-representations rather than acontextual, static attributes. 
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Another aspect of the "we-self' is the idea of "loose ego-boundaries" (Roland, 
1988). In this situation the person's sense of self is in terms of a we-ness in that the 
person always has another in mind when thinking of him/herself. The 'other' is 
represented internally as being connected to Vie person in varying degrees of intimacy 
or in varying degrees of subordination or superiority. The we-ness may also be 
experienced as the "self enmeshed and allied with the extended family, jati (caste4) or 
other groups as a whole" (Roland, 1988, p. 225). According to Roland ( 1988, p. 224 ), 
"This conveys both the intense dependency and the reciprocity of adult mutuality." In 
other words, the other person is often more related to one in terms of one's self and 
needs and conversely, one's self is often closely related to fulfilling other's needs. 
(Roland, 1988). Hence, according to Roland (1988), there is a heightened sensitivity 
and mutual reciprocity around empathic awareness of, and responsitivity to the other's 
moods or needs for closeness, affection, dependency or esteem. 
Others are expected to sense and meet one's needs without one taking responsibility 
for overtly expressing these and actively getting these met (Roland, 1988). Also, any 
internal distress, for example, frustration, anger, hurt is dealt with by relying on the 
other's responsitivity (which is subtly or indirectly provoked) to regain equanimity 
(Roland, 1988). 
This relying on the other's goodwill is what Doi (1963, p. 64) has labelled "ameuru". 
Ameuru refers to the behaviour exhibited to get a particular need met. This need is 
what Doi (1971) points out as being at the centre of the interdependency typical of 
Japanese culture. Doi (1971, p. 7) calls this need "amae". Amae refers to_the need to 
be loved in a nurturant protective sense. It refers to a desire for dependence. Doi 
(1963, p. 75) says that "the amae mentality (may) be defined as the attempt to deny the 
fact of separation that is such an inseparable part of human existence and to obli.terate. 
the pain of separation". 
According to Doi (1963) the individual has no sense of self other than amae, or the 
desire to be affirmed, or to belong. Doi (1971, p.19) calls this state being "at the mercy 
4 Caste refers to a religio-mythical delineation of a social group. 
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of amae" in that any threat of isolation or rejection from the group is akin to a threat of 
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a loss of self. As a result, the individual is submersed completely in the group (Doi, 
1971, p.134 ), in that any individual opinion, preference or intention that differs from the 
group norm is unexpressed or moulded to fit accordingly. 
According to Doi (1971), this is associated with a tendency to preserve the harmony 
of the relationship at the expense of individualistic assertion or autonomy. Hence there 
is heightened sensitivity to mutual regard, affirmation, approval, as well as vulnerability 
to rejection and disapproval as manifested by concern for the evaluative impact of one's 
behaviours. 
Another description of the self in Eastern cultures includes the following: that 
"self-definition resides in others" (Slate, 1992, p. 436). One sees oneself as, for 
example, a family member, member of a corporate organisation - hence the importance 
placed on belonging to a larger whole (De Vos, 1985). Thus there exists strong 
identification with the reputation and honour of the family or corporate organisation 
(Roland, 1988). Linked to this is a concomitant loyalty to upholding jati (caste) 
customs, culture, and traditions (Roland, 1988) in which the prosperity of the 
organisation as a whole is a source of self-regard rather than recognition for one's 
individual contribution. 
Related to this concept of identity is the notion of the self as being "realised in role 
behaviour'' (De Vos, 1985, p. 158) which refers to a sense of pride or self-regard in 
fulfilling one's occupational function (De Vos, 1985). Role behaviour also refers to 
one's social role or position in the hierarchical network of interpersonal relationships. 
"Self as realised in role behaviour manifests in the careful sensitivity to, and 
observance of traditionally defined contextual norms involving reciprocal. 
responsibilities and obligations and observance to the social etiquette of diverse 
hierarchical relationships" (Roland, 1988, p. 8). Another example of 'self as being 
realised in role behaviour is the strict adherence, in Hindu mysticism to one's 'dharma' 
or correct conduct as expected from one's stage in the life cycle. 
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Self-Construct in African Cultures 
According to Bastide (1973 in Alt, 1988) the 'self is seen to be composed of forces, 
as well as being in dynamic connection wit~ forces of social and cosmic nature. The 
term "open force field" (Frankel in Beattie, 1980, p. 316) gives a clear description of this 
idea. Furthermore, 'force' is what makes communication possible. Hence the view 
exists of a universe where self, other, and offspring are interrelated as a system of 
dynamic forces. 
A relational concept of person exists in African culture. Each person is seen as a 
process of dynamic interaction. Sow (1977, in Alt, 1988) describes three levels of 
interaction: 
(1) Vertically (or the phylogenetic dimension). This involves relationships to ancestral 
beings. The type of interaction that this affords is one of idealised meaning-giving in 
that the ancestor constitutes the foundation of the person's culture, being, law. 
(2) Horizontally. This involves interactions with others of the larger community. 
(3) Ontogenetically. This involves the relationships to his/her lineage and nuclear 
family. 
The boundaries between the individual, society, and belief system in African culture 
are seen as diffuse (Alt, 1988). The various dimensions of interactions afford the 
experiential reality of different aspects of 'self. These 'aspects' include being, identity 
and individuality (Alt, 1988). 
According to Alt (1988), the person experiences his/her being, or one could say, 
essence via the phylogenetic dimension. This may be interpreted as: the individual's. 
'essence' is experienced as spiritual through hereditary connections to his/her 
ancestors. 
According to Alt ( 1988), he/she experiences identity via the relationships with the 
larger community. Here the concept of "micro-societies" (Sow, 1980, p. 159) is 
relevant. These function like peer groups, which are relatively autonomous - having 
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their own traditions, and which are based on the principle·s of mutual education, 
seniority and modelling. It is via these micro-societies that integration into society is 
facilitated and hence role identity is assumed. In these micro-societies, people learn 
how to maintain the structural/hierarchical 51ature of the bigger society by assuming 
their age and task related positions. Thus identity here can be said to refer to the idea 
of social role, with social role being intimately connected to a person's age class. 
Various rituals herald and publicise a change in identity. An example is the initiation 
rites ceremonies which highlight the movement from child to adult identity. According 
to Sow (1980, p. 160), "the initiation process generally includes three major phases 
separated in space and time: separation (death), reclusion (marginality), reintegration 
(rebirth)". Sow (1980, p. 161) describes the initiation process as follows "its harshness, 
along with the painful experience of personal loneliness during the initiation process, 
revives and extends the crisis of weaning". The initiation process is thought to facilitate 
the transition to adult social role status. Thus, it would involve a mastering of fear and 
the development of competencies for dealing with life and problems in order to assume 
the social responsibilities of the adult role. 
According to Alt (1988), the experience of individuality occurs within the nuclear 
family. To elaborate, because of the person's lineage, he/she is assigned a precise 
place in relation to the family and to the group as a whole (Sow, 1980). His/her 
individuality is born out in the following parameters: order of birth, sexual category, 
possible resemblance to a living relative or forefather, status as related to age class, 
to level of initiation, to caste at birth (Sow, 1980). 
Of note here, is the practice of naming. The name given to the individual expresses 
the power of certain ancestors and situations on him/her (Alt, 1988). The name confers. 
on the individual his/her own essence or force without which he/she is vulnerable to the 
negative external forces both cosmological and social. If the person has force, he/she 
has agency and thus freedom to create him-/herself (Alt, 1988). He/she thus has an 
avenue for expressing his/her individuality by living out what the name means to him 
or her. 
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Thus, it can be said that the 'self is not contained within the intrapsychic world. The 
'self is 'spread out' in the levels of interactions which exist along the three major 
dimensions discussed (namely, with ancestral spirits, with community and with the 
nuclear family). .. 
Another feature of the African concept of 'self is the notion of identification with the 
group's traditions, ideals and values as a source of self-esteem (Alt, 1988). Standards 
are not internalised but are 'held' in the group. Moral authority, although always 
present, remains outside the individual (Sow in Alt, 1988) and experienced threats of 
persecution are largely in response to a break in cohesion and homogeneity of the 
group rather than due to an individual transgression. 
Self-Construct in Individualist Cultures 
In contrast, in general, the Western construct of self can be said to be that of an 
autonomous, self-contained, acontextual individual. Markus and Kitayama (1971, p. 
226) refer to this as the "independent construal". This construal comes from a belief 
in the wholeness and uniqueness of each person's configuration of internal attributes. 
According to this view, the social context is only necessary to affirm the "inner core of 
the self' and not for constructing this "inner core". In other words self-representations 
have as their referent some individual desire, preference, or attribute rather than 
another person as referent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991 ). Johnson ( 1985) talks about 
the western "self' as reflecting the culture of individuality which emphasises 
self-expression, self-reliance, personal freedom, and enhancement. 
Can Self-Expression be seen to Occur in a Way Other Than by 
Opposing Public Opinion? 
It can be said that Jung (1959) theorises from a Western culture. Hence, the form 
of self-expression Jung (1959) describes can be said to reflect what occurs in a 
Western culture. Thus, it was thought that an exploration of, what may be interpreted 
as, self-expression in other cultures would aid in addressing the above question. 
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The question: can self-expression be seen to occur in a way' other than by opposing 
public opinion arose primarily from the experiential tension involving individuality 
versus group acceptance. This tension involved the experience of mutual exclusivity 
of the opposite poles of the dialectic. This meant a difficulty in integrating the opposite 
poles in such a way that neither pole would be lost. The only resolution which 
presented itself involved the tension that by ensuring group acceptance, individuality 
would be lost, and that by ensuring individuality, group acceptance would be lost. This 
tension found expression in pushing aside 'wanting to' by complying with 'having to' in 
order to prioritise group interest thus ensuring relational harmony and group 
acceptance. 
Doi's (1971) comment (to be discussed in the next paragraph) can be said to 
illustrate the above discussed expression of this tension albeit in broader terms. He 
discusses a group of people in relation to the macro-socio-cultural context in contrast 
to discussing an individual's experience in relation to the group. 
Doi ( 1971 ) makes a comment with regards self-expression in Collectivist cultures. 
Doi (1971) refers to the Japanese culture stating that the desire to belong takes the 
place of an individual sense of self to such an extent that individuality or 
self-expression disappears in group conformity and the preservation of relational 
harmony. This links with Jacobi's (1976, p. 35) comment that the "persona (may) 
degenerate into total mimicry". Since 'persona' may be interpreted as the way a person 
adapts to society, "degeneration of the persona" can be said to refer to a form of 
adaptation in which there is no self-expression but mere copying or complying with 
societal norms and cultural dictates. Doi (1971) seems to be suggesting that this 
possibly happens in Japanese cultures, namely that the tension of individuality versus 
group acceptance is resolved in Japanese cultures by losing individuality for the sake. 
of preserving group acceptance. Hence, it was thought that if one could find out how 
self-expression can be seen to occur in Japanese cultures, a way of retaining 
individuality while at the same time preserving group acceptance would be found. 
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Self-Expression in Collectivist Cultures 
Roland (1980) describes that in spite of the strict adherence to hierarchical group 
norms and social etiquette, the person's m•noeuvrability in getting his/her needs or 
wants met is a form of self-expression since this form of adaptability is unique to the 
individual in his/her context. Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggest that self-assertion 
while simultaneously preserving interpersonal harmony and cooperation is a more 
developed form of self-expression. Roland (1988) discusses how the practice of using 
another as an extension of oneself in order to express a particular desire occurs as well 
as a form of manipulation of superiors to get a request fulfilled while overtly remaining 
within the boundaries of one's hierarchical position. 
Secondly, Roland (1980) discusses how, what can be called a superficial adherence 
to social etiquette and role obligations, takes place while the person's true feelings or 
intentions are conveyed in nonverbal or other subtle ways. This is especially so when 
these feelings would threaten intergroup harmony or would spark conflict. Thus Roland 
(1980) suggests the often dual/incongruent nature of communication in which what is 
said is not always what is meant. 
Roland ( 1980, 1988) marks the development of the spiritual, transcendent self as 
a primary form of self-expression in Indian (Hindu) culture. According to Roland (1980, 
1988) the individual develops the spiritual self by imbuing daily practices with special 
meaning, thus allowing for inner transformations for the purpose of eventually 
becoming "one with the godhead" (p. 289). Thus the exercise of one's _dharma (or 
expected) behaviour is regarded as a spiritually significant form of self-expression. 
As an example, De Vos ( 1993) says that complete devotion to a social rol~ may. 
seem like a form of self-sacrifice in which the persona is subsumed in the social role 
leaving no space for self-expression. However, as De Vos (1993) describes, the 
person gains meaning by sacrificing him-/herself to a larger cause or by exercising a 
moral duty for the sake of a highly valued ethic. In this way, self-expression takes the 
form of the wish to uphold this ethic even at the expense of forsaking any other 
self-fulfilment. 
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Roland (1988) describes another way in which individuality can be said to be 
facilitated. This involves spiritual pursuits which allow for a degree of detachment from 
familial emotional bonds. By detachment, Roland (1988) implies that the individual is 
less dependent on the other for the fulfilme111t of ego needs and thus relates in a less 
intensely inter-connected way. These practices in themselves allow for a greater 
degree of personal choice, privacy, differentiation, and freedom of expression. 
Now to return to the comment made earlier that in Japanese cultures self-expression 
may possibly be discarded for the sake of group conformity (Doi, 1971 ). 
From the previous discussion it can be said that some form of self-expression, be it 
subtle, indirect or non-verbal is retained in collectivist cultures. This is in accord with 
Roland's (1980, p. 82) emphasis that despite the collective ideal of the we-self there 
is the development and maintenance of a "private self' which consists of the 
individual's opinions and tendencies and which when revealed is done in a veiled way. 
Doi (1985, p. 36, 37), writing later about "tatemae" (social conventions) and "honne" 
(personal views), and motivations also implies a compromise between self-expression 
and the collective ideal by his statement that "tatemae conceals and reveals honne". 
In the Eastern cultures discussed above, it can be said that the overt and direct 
expression of individual wants, opinions, pursuits is not strictly incorporated into the 
collective ideal. In African cultures, the collective ideal, or that which society 
prescribes, is the 'self that functions according to its age-class, level of initiation and 
caste positions in accord with the ancestral influences. However, in African culture 
self-expression can be said to be formally instituted and sanctioned by the social 
structures and practices themselves, for example: in the lineage structure and naming 
practice. Hence, the overt and direct expression of individuality can be said. to be. 
incorporated into the African culture's collective ideal. 
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Self-Expression in Individualist Cultures 
Self-expression in a culture prescribing individuality may be described by using 
Maslow's (1971) image of the self-actualisiAg person. 
From his writing, Maslow (1971) seems to be urging for a curbing against complete 
espousal of public opinion, or the adoption of role definitions. Maslow (1971) implies, 
and Muller (1987) states that it is easy for the person in modern Western culture to live 
through occupational status categories or other role definitions, for example, successful 
yuppie. Maslow (1971) seems to be suggesting that the individual move away from 
adopting role definitions towards self-actualisation. 
The process of self-actualisation according to Maslow (1971) incorporates three 
aspects. Firstly, coming to know oneself - one's likes, dislikes, purpose or vocation, 
being true to these and committed to their development and expression. Secondly, this 
involves taking responsibility for, and making what Maslow (1971, p. 47) calls "growth 
choices", the choice which demands courage to go beyond defences, repressions or 
popular opinion. Thirdly, it involves attempting to fulfil what Maslow ( 1991, p. 133-135) 
calls "8-values" or metaneeds. These include self-sufficiency: autonomy, 
independence, self-determination, separateness, environmental transcendence, and 
uniqueness, idiosyncrasy, individuality. 
A comment is that Maslow's (1971) notion of the self-actualising person does not 
incorporate how the expression of dependency and belonging needs occur in a culture 
prescribing autonomy and independency. Johnson (1985) suggests that any existence 
of interdependent relationships is disguised in an inflated sense of individuality such 
that these dependency needs are not given overt acknowledgement and expression. 
Can a Relationship be seen to Exist Between the Socio-Cultural Context 
and the Process of Self-Expression? 
From the above section it may be concluded that self-expression can be seen to 
occur in a variety of other ways not just by opposing public opinion; even the opposite 
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of opposing public opinion, namely, preserving relational ·harmony or sacrificing 
individual opinions, pursuits for group priorities may be regarded as a form of 
self-expression in collectivist cultures. Various forms or modifications of self-assertive 
(typical of self-expression in Western cultures, namely, expressing one's individualist 
needs, wants, opinions, and following one's pursuits even if these oppose public 
opinion) are also regarded as a form of self-expression in collectivist cultures (Roland, 
1980). 
However, it can be said that in Western culture, anything other than self-expression 
in the typical (Western) sense of the term (self-assertive behaviour), is regarded as a 
form of compliance. Furthermore, even though it was concluded that in Japanese 
cultures, ways of self-expression occur that allow for the expression of individuality 
while simultaneously preserving group acceptance, it was thought that the adoption of 
such solutions would not be experienced as self-expression but either as conformity or 
false self-expression in a Western culture. 
Thus, it can be said that these conclusions point to a relationship between the 
socio-cultural context and the process of self-expression or individualist behaviour. 
The following section will be an attempt to address the question: can a relationship be 
seen to exist between the socio-cultural context and the process of self-expression or 
individualist behaviour? 
The metaneeds proposed by Maslow (1971) can be said to be very much in line with 
the Western construct of self (Johnson, 1985). Thus it may be concluded that the 
description of self-expression extracted from Maslow's (1971) writing is very much 
congruent with the collective ideal of Western society. 
This is in contrast with Eastern societies in which the compromise between 
self-expression and the collective ideal ranges from congruence to complex 
interrelationships (Roland, 1980). However, in African collectivist culture, 
self-expression can also be said to be congruent with the collective ideal (which is the 
same as what can be said to be the case in an individualistic culture). In other words, 
the collective ideal of African culture can be said to incorporate prescriptions or norms 
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(in the form of role behaviour or traditional practices) of what self-expression entails. 
Thus, it can be said that one may not conclude that in individualist cultures 
self-expression is congruent with the collective ideal, but in collective cultures 
self-expression varies from congruency to.oomplex interrelationships (Roland, 1980) 
with the collective ideal. 
Thus, further exploration of what the presumed relationship between self-expression 
and the socio-cultural context can be said to entail needs to take place. 
It is on the basis of theorising about the relationship between self-expression and the 
collective ideal that notions such as narcissism, altruism, and individuality arise. 
These terms can be said to describe various forms of the self-group dialectic. In this 
discussion, self-group refers to the individual and the collective ideal (or the 'self that 
society prescribes). Hence narcissism, altruism and individuality are used as 
descriptive terms for any relationship thought to exist between the individual and the 
socio-cultural context. These terms will be used in the following discussion. 
From the discussion of the various forms of self-expression in a collectivist culture, 
one interpretation is that pseudo self-expression occurs. To elaborate - expression of 
individual wishes, needs or feelings are either hidden or expressed indirectly when 
these are seen to conflict with the cultural ethic. 
Masterson (1985) regards this hidden, indirect self-expression of collective societies 
as a form of narcissistic (selfish in layman's terms) behaviour under the guise of group 
conformity or self-sacrificial behaviour. According to Masterson (1985) the person does 
not take responsibility for directly asserting and fulfilling individual needs or wants but 
does so vicariously through the other. 
Tang (1992) calls the person's social role or form of self-expression within cultural 
constraints a false self. Similarly Fromm ( 1941, p. 257) uses the term "bondage" to 
imply being trapped into "sacrificing the integrity of one's individual self' for the sake 
of security found in group conformity and group identity. 
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Fromm's (1941, p. 258) concept of self-realisation as the 0 active expression of his 
emotional and intellectual potentialities" can be said to describe self-expression in 
societies prescribing individuality. Fromm (1941, p. 265) elaborates on this concept 
saying that it "is an end that can never•lte subordinated to purposes which are 
supposed to have greater dignity''. According to Fromm (1941, pp. 267-268) "a genuine 
ideal is not some veiled force superior to the individual but is the articulate expression 
of utmost affirmation of the self'. Thus Fromm ( 1941 ) seems to be elevating 
self-expression beyond any higher cause or spiritual reality. This could be regarded 
as an extreme form of narcissism because 'self is raised not only above the 'other' or 
group but also above any Transcendental Reality. 
A comment to be made is that while Masterson (1985) can be said to use the concept 
of self-expression of Western society, as highlighted by Maslow (1971) and Fromm 
( 1941 ), as a basis to evaluate the form of self-expression in collective societies as 
veiled narcissism, Masterson (1985) implies that the self-expression of Western society 
is genuine, whereas when looked at from another perspective, it (self-expression in 
Western society) may appear extremely narcissistic. Similarly, conformity in Japanese 
culture may be regarded from one individualistic cultural perspective as "bondage" 
(Fromm, 1941, p. 257) yet from another individualistic perspective as altruistic. 
However, Tatara, (1982, p. 232) states "In Japan conformity does not necessarily mean 
self-denial, but rather is considered as a way to achieve self-actualisation (as) a means 
of preserving individuality" "The word 'conformity' does not carry the connotation of 
loss-of-self as it does in English" (Murase & Johnson, 197 4 in Tatara, 1982, p. 232). 
Thus, it may be concluded that what is regarded as pseudo self-expression, altruistic 
expression or even narcissistic expression from one cultural perspe<:tive, may be 
regarded as an expression of individuality from another. 
A comment is that not only is the ·self or collective ideal socio-culturally constructed, 
but so too is the process of adaptation of the individual to society. In other words, the 
way in which the individual expresses him-/herself in relation to the prevailing collective 
ideal is itself socio-culturally constructed. 
41 
Hence, it may be concluded that a relationship between the socio-cultural context 
and the process of self-expression or individualist behaviour can be seen to exist. This 
relationship can be said to involve the following: that the socio-cultural context 
influences the process of self-expression by {.fefining what is regarded as narcissistic, 
altruistic or individualist behaviour. Hence, what is regarded by one culture as 
conformative behaviour, may be experienced or regarded by an individual in another 
culture as individualist behaviour. 
Individuation in Collectivist Cultural Contexts 
In this section an attempt is made to address the question of what individuation can 
be seen to entail in a collectivist culture. It was thought that a theory of individuation 
as it occurs in a collectivist culture would aid in resolving difficulties in the experience 
of individuation by deconstructing pre-existing conceptualisations of individuation given 
normative value by Western discourse practices. Hence, this section discusses various 
writers' descriptions of individuation as it is seen to occur in collectivist cultural 
contexts. 
A Description of Individuation in African Cultures 
Erny (1972) and Sow (1980) (in Alt, 1988) put forward three phases in the 
development of the child in African cultures. 
The first phase is called a "fusion relationship" (Alt, 1988, p. 253) in ·which there 
exists close physical proximity between mother and infant as well as the undisturbed 
gratification of needs. After a rather extended symbiosis, the infant is weaned and the 
mother no longer eases all the tensions of the infant. 
According to Alt ( 1988), this abrupt weaning marks the beginning of the second 
phase. The abrupt weaning is regarded as a "violent crisis" (Alt, 1988, p. 254) 
accompanied by an intense experience of abandonment. In this second phase, the 
child begins socially to move away from the mother. However, there is always a mother 
substitute to make the violent separation less traumatic. According to Alt (1988), the 
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effect that this has on later relating, is that while deep and sincere relationships can be 
formed, the loss of these is easily overcome by the forming of other relationships. For 
Alt (1988), this weaning crisis predisposes the individual to an intuitive recognition of 
the vulnerability of human relationships. • • 
The third phase marks the second major crisis according to Alt (1988). This 
happens at about five to six years of age when the child is placed within its peer group. 
Hence, Alt (1988) rem?rks that there is a style of communal upbringing where children 
are brought up in groups with other children. Thus there is less of an individualised, 
focused and consistent style of parenting. The child experiences many mother 
substitutes rather than one single reliable mother. Furthermore, there is less of a 
sharing of personalised, individualised meaning systems between mother and infant 
and more of a sharing of what Alt (1988, p. 255) calls a "common unconscious ... a 
shared universe of meanings and experience". This may be interpreted as dependence 
on group acceptance and idealisation of traditional customs and beliefs as integral to 
self-esteem. This may also be interpreted as involving a retaining of relational ties (as 
the child is brought up communally), which fosters a sub-ordination of individualistic, 
competitive strivings but at the same time offers a sense of assurance in group 
belongingness. 
A Description of Individuation in Indian Culture 
According to Roland (1980), the style of early-infant mothering involves a symbiotic 
relationship whereby there is an indulgent gratification of physical and emotional needs 
which gives rise to a heightened sense of narcissistic well-being. Physical proximity 
betv./een mother and infant is encouraged and if the mother is not at hand, an aunt or 
other relative takes her place. Disciplining is achieved by the toddler being bribed out 
of doing a reprehensible deed and by the mother conveying unverbalised disapproving 
moods. 
However, around the age of three to five years, to early teens begins what Bassa (in 
Roland, 1980, p. 79) calls "the cardinal crisis of Indian childhood". According to Roland 
(1980), this refers to an imposition of strict demands for respect. obedience and 
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conformity to well-defined hierarchical role expectations ·and a strict curbing of 
self-assertive responses, for example, aggressive or demanding behaviour. This gives 
rise to anxiety over meeting familial expectations because the individual realises he/she 
has to earn acceptance and approval in sharp contrast to immediate experiences of 
assurance of well-being. He/she earns this approval by the adherence to the jati 
(caste) customs and family traditions. Hence the development of the 'we-self strongly 
connected to the role obligations and mutual need fulfilling functions. Thus the primary 
disciplinary style is one of shaming because by shaming, the child is made aware of the 
negative experience of disapproval or rejection, or the threat of that, and thus is 
motivated to avoid it. 
A Description of Individuation in Japanese Culture 
The development of the we-self in Japanese culture may be interpreted as being 
facilitated by the following ways: According to De Vos (1985) awareness of the 
potentially negative consequences of behaviour such as the potential for hurting one's 
family and not only oneself is inculcated. Obedience in and for itself is secondary to 
cultivating this awareness. Hence, De Vos (1985, p. 155) talks about mothers tending 
to "suffer their children" rather than using verbal chastisement by expressing 
exhaustion or some other potentially 'self-injurious' affect. The child then responds to 
the fear of; having potentially hurt the loved one on whom he/she is dependent. 
Also, there exists a socialisation of achievement motives not individualistically but 
collectively defined (De Vos, 1993). Positive self-regard is gained largely by meeting 
external expectations of successful performance (Roland, 1988). Hence, it may be 
interpreted that what Westerners would call the internal superego functions of approval 
or disapproval come largely from external responses from significant others. 
Furthermore, according to Roland ( 1988), Japanese children are discouraged from 
making their wishes known and instead develop the tendency to rely on seniors to 
sense and meet their needs accordingly. This may be regarded as being in line with 
a form of intuitive. empathic, nonverbal communication seen to exist in Japanese 
cultures. A form of disciplining in which conforming behaviour is induced by actively 
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moving with the child (De Vos, 1993), can be said to foster this style of communication. 
Lebra (in OeCraemer, 1983, p. 28) calls the relationship between mother and child 
facilitating this, "skinship". 
•• 
Thus, it may be interpreted that intrapsychic functions, for example, need expression 
and fulfilment, self-regard or disregard becomes intrinsically interwoven with the 
feedback from others. 
Conclusion 
It can be said that the discussions of individuation in collectivist cultures involve 
primarily a discussion of child-rearing practices and how this affects individual 
development as conceptualised from a Western frame of reference using 
psychodynamic terminology and hence a psychodynamic theoretical perspective on self 
development. Thus, it can be said that the conceptualisation of the development of the 
self per se or a conceptualisation of individuation, is no different than when theorised 
about as it occurs in a Western cultural context. This will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SELF IN RELATION TO OTHER 
•• 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter involves addressing the experiential tension in the self-in-
relation-to-other dimension. This tension encompasses difficulties in becoming the 
separate, self-contained, independent individual according to psychodynamic theory. 
Since this tension involves intrapsychic experience and the interpersonal relationship, 
both psychodynamic and systemic theory were consulted to gain a conceptual 
understanding of this tension in order to facilitate its resolution in practice. 
Central themes of the experiential tension took on expression in the form of the 
separateness versus togetherness dialectic, and individuation as lineal progression or 
recursive process dialectic. It was thought that by integrating these dialectics in theory, 
or by conceptualising them differently, a way of resolving them in practice would be 
facilitated. 
Individuation in terms of Psychodynamic Theory 
Psychodynamic writers have theorised how the individual encounters separation in 
order to relate in a "mature", "need-free" or "self-less" way. It is this process of 
becoming separate that is the essence of individuation in psychodynamic thoery. 
Individuation as Becoming Separate and Emotionally Autonomous 
The idea of becoming separate is rooted in Margaret Mahler's ( 1972a) theory of 
separation-individuation. Although Mahler and her colleagues (Mahler. Pine. & 
Bergman. 1994) have emphasised that their theory describes a process which is 
circumscribed to the first three years of life, other authors have theorised about related 
themes as they occur at later chronological stages (e.g .. Blas. 1967: Colarusso, 1990) 
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It is intended to find a common thread in these authors' writings which would afford 
an interpretation of individuation. 
Mahoney's (1991, p. 223) outline of Mah~s phases of the separation-individuation 
process will be used. The first phase is called the autistic phase (0 - 1 month). 
Primitive, undifferentiated, and poorly organised efforts to self-regulate and satisfy 
biological needs occurs in this phase. The next phase is called the symbiotic phase 
(1 - S months). Here the infant experiences his/her mother's inner states as if they 
were his/her own. The term for this is fusion or merger. The infant is hypothesised to 
experience a state of omnipotence or being all powerful, as any state of dis-ease is 
magically relieved. The next phase is called the differentiation phase (S - 9 months). 
Mahler (1972a, p. 334) describes this phase as involving a "hatching from the mother-
infant symbiotic common orbit" whereby the infant's attention is gradually directed 
beyond the mother-infant bond. This phase marks the start of the evolution of the 
experience of being separate from the mother. The next phase is called the practising 
phase (9 - 1 S months). In this phase it is hypothesised that the infant still has the 
perception of his/her mother always being available to magically relieve any dis-ease. 
Coupled to this is his/her newly developed motoric abilities. These two factors together 
give rise to the ideas of grandiosity and narcissism thought to characterise this phase. 
Mahler (1972a, p. 336) describes this phase as the infant's "love affair with the world". 
The next phase is called the rapprochement phase (15 - 24 months). Mahler 
( 1972b) placed emphasis on this phase since the preferred outcome of this phase was 
hypothesised to be separation or the awareness by the infant of being alone and 
largely helpless in a big world. In this phase it was hypothesised that the polarities of: 
fusion versus separateness and fear-of-mother-loss versus object constancy are 
negotiated. The dilemma inherent in the fusion versus separateness polarity in"volved 
wanting to guard a newfound autonomy, yet not wanting to lose a sense of grandeur 
and omnipotence characteristic of the previous phase. According to Mahoney ( 1991, 
p. 223), in this phase "pronounced feelings of anxiety and vulnerability are negotiated 
to the extent that child and mother remain attuned and responsive despite their 
separateness". The last phase is called the consolidation phase (24 - 36 months) 
Here the negotiation of fear-of-mother-loss versus object constancy is thought to be 
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completed. The desired outcome is that of object constancy which Pine (1994) 
describes as the awareness that even though mother is not part of the self, she is 
nonetheless potentially available even if not physically present. Hence, it may be 
concluded that the desired outcomes of th~·process are separation (a sense of being 
different from the mother), object constancy, and what Mahler, Pine and Bergman 
(1994, p. 423) call uan awareness of a sense of being ... not a sense of who I am, but 
that I amn. They see this as the first step in the development of identity. 
Bies ( 1967) discusses the adolescent developmental phase as a recapitulation 
(albeit with different outcomes) of the separation-individuation of toddlerhood. 
The crux of Bias's (1967, p. 163) conceptualisation of adolescent individuation is the 
notion of independence from "internalized objectsn. By this he means that the 
adolescent becomes less dependent on known (parental) ways of assuring affirmation, 
security or relief from discomforting internal states, for example, confusion or anxiety. 
Bies (1967, p. 177) talks about "emancipation from childhood dependencies, 
prohibitions and loyalties". Because internal states are less regulated by past 
experiences, the onus is on the individual to regulate internal states that ensure, for 
example, a sense of self-esteem, security, fulfilment. Bies (1967, p. 163) uses the term 
"cathectic shifts" to describe the release of energy available when the adolescent 
becomes less invested in parental injunctions as being all-powerful absolutes. This 
independence from "internalised objects", (p. 163) has the dual effect of allowing more 
freedom for the finding of one's own interests, values and goals, but also the less 
comforting effect of realising that the parent is not the all-powerful other who always 
and absolutely ensures the fulfilment of his/her needs and the appeasement of 
uncomfortable internal states. Blas ( 1967, p. 181) talks about "secondary object 
constancy" to refer to this process by which the parent is divested of his/her magical; 
all-powerful status and becomes "humanised". 
Blas ( 1967) sees adolescent rebellion as one way of attempting this separation "from 
internalised objects". Blas ( 1967) talks about the peer group as having the function of 
testing out ways of developing one's individuality, but at the same time as potentially 
having the regressive function of substitute "internalised objects" (p. 163), whereby the 
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individual depends on the group for the regulation of internal states and meeting needs. 
Bies (1967) talks about adolescent preoccupation as following from the 
disengagement from "internalised objectsn ~J!>. 163). By this he means that the energy 
invested in automatically obeying parental norms or injunctions is sometimes redirected 
towards preoccupation with the self, instead of being redirected to new forms of relating 
with others. 
Blas (1967) says that the inability to disengage from internalised objects is 
experienced as a sense of alienation but that disengagement from internalised objects 
is akin to the experience of loss and thus accompanied by the effect of a mourning 
process. By loss of the "internal object", Blas (1967, p. 182) refers to the awareness 
that the omnipotent parent is no longer available in the way that he/she used to be. 
Josselson (1980) also gives a psychoanalytic account of individuation in 
adolescence. 
Before continuing, the following is noted: separation in infanthood according to 
Mahler's (1972a) theory involves seeing oneself as different from the mother. This 
happens when the 'psychic life-sustaining' functions (e.g., comforting, soothing, 
safeguarding) are felt to take place independently from the mother's physical 
presence. This happens when the child introjects the mother in such a way that when 
he/she needs to be soothed, he/she replays a memory trace of the mother doing this. 
In this way the mother as mother introject is experienced as constantly present - hence 
the notion of object-constancy. 
In adolescence, the central task is separating not from the real/physical mother as· 
happens in infanthood, but separating from the parental introjects. Separating from the 
parental introjects may be interpreted as involving the following: one regulates internal 
states not on the basis of asking oneself, for example, "What would mom or dad say?" 
or by recalling what behavioural response led to pride or approval as secondary to a 
similar reaction from the parents. Josselson (1980) calls this process individuation 
from introjected parental objects. The new ways one makes decisions or regulates 
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internal states she calls autonomous ego functions. Josselson (1980) points out that 
'autonomous' does not necessarily mean opposite to parental norms and values but 
that the making of decisions and regulation of internal states is not automatically 
dictated by memories of past parental inv~l\lement. Josselson (1980, p. 196) makes 
a significant comment in relation to this, namely: that the struggle for autonomy is "not 
against the parents but against the adolescent's own wishes to deny his/her 
alonenessn. 
These ego functions are then consolidated into a new identity. Hence Josselson 
(1980) saw the individuating process of adolescence as involving the interdependent 
sequence of: individuation, autonomy, and identity formation. According to Josselson 
( 1980, p. 191 ), the experience of individuation is ua feeling of selfhood and will" - that 
one's choices are one's own and so too is the responsibility therefore. 
Mahler (1972a) did not go into much depth in describing the individuation side of the 
separation - individuation process of infanthood. Mahler, Pine, and Bergman's (1994) 
comment was that there is an assumption of individual characteristics. According to 
Bias's (1967) and Josselson's (1980) theorising, individuation takes on greater 
expression in adolescence. According to Josselson (1980), the assumption of 
individual characteristics occurs when ego functions are consolidated into a new 
identity. 
According to Josselson (1980), identity formation is the result of minute, seemingly 
inconsequential steps. In this way, one builds up a perception of oneself and others 
that matches the world's perception of oneself, so that there exists a congruence 
between one's sense of inner sameness and continuity and the sameness and 
continuity of one's meaning for others. In this way, one gains a sense of belonging to 
a group reality outside of oneself. In addition to this, one's way of relating is less 
governed by needs for emotional equanimity and narcissistic well-being. 
Josselson ( 1980) goes into some depth in discussing the processes of separating 
from parental introjects of infancy/childhood and its implications for identity formation. 
For example. Josselson ( 1980) states that due to the gradual separating from the 
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automatic adherence to "shoulds" and "oughts" simply to avoid internal dis-ease, an 
increased vulnerability is experienced as self-esteem becomes dependent on the 
teenager's current activities and types of relational feedback he/she receives in 
response to these. Josselson (1980, p. 19i)atalks about "loss of an internal protective 
function" when "introjects are deidealised" and "the ego striv(ing) to reconstitute the 
superego-ego-ideal system with more realistic content and thus moum(ing) the loss of 
narcissistic omnipotence, replacing it with self-esteem". Also, Josselson (1980) talks 
about a threat to the continuity of the experience of a stable sense of self. Due to 
gradual separating from automatic ways of doing things, making decisions, regulating 
states of ease or dis-ease, there is a feeling of having moved past previous perceptions 
of self without yet having established new perceptions to replace these. 
According to Josselson (1980) the intrapsychic process of separating from parental 
introjects may get played out in reality. For example, a teenager may fly into a rage 
when his/her mother simply asks: "Where are you going?" According to Josselson 
(1980), for a moment, the reality mother is experienced as the controlling, all-powerful 
parental introject of childhood. 
Josselson (1980) postulates that psychoanalytic theory concludes that adolescence 
is a time of tumultuous rebellion and breaking of emotional/parental ties. She notes 
• that this conclusion is contradicted by research which states that most adolescents 
retain fundamentally positive, valuing, close, and warm relationships with parents. 
Colarusso (1990) builds on Mahler's (1972a) and Bias's (1967) theorising to discuss 
how the issues of fusion, separation, object loss get played out in the typical relational 
patterns of adulthood (i.e. as spouse, parent, and child of aging parent). According to 
Colarusso (1990), the more one is dependent on mental representations of parental 
influence, or the more one is bound to internalised parental introjects, the greater is the 
experienced threat of losing the supportive, emotional ties of the parent. Colarusso 
( 1990) thus alludes to the presence of an ongoing tension in adulthood between 
independence of self and loss of emotional ties. 
According to the above conceptual framework - Mahler (1972a), Blas (1967), 
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Josselson (1980) - becoming separate (seeing oneself as different from the significant 
other and the world, and independently regulating one's own emotional states) and 
individuated (developing individual ideals, beliefs, goals, interests) is a necessary 
condition for mature relating. The notion of .,mature relating• will be elaborated on by 
using the writings of psychodynamic theorists (e.g., Haase, 1993) and existential 
theorists (e.g., Yalom, 1980). 
In short, mature relating involves relating to another in such a way that one can be 
alone in the relationship. One does not need the other to fulfill an emotional function 
by way of unconscious or unsaid expectations or obligatory binds. The emotional 
function (be it self-affirmation, self-comforting), is fulfilled directly or indirectly by the 
individual alone. In other words, one can self-validate or self-soothe oneself, or that 
one takes responsibility for requiring this from the other and so consciously and overtly 
takes on the needy, requesting position rather than expecting the other to magically 
know and fulfill this need. 
Another aspect of mature relating is that one responds to the other as completely 
other and not as part of one's own experience. This involves not responding to the 
other as if one would respond to one's own needs. In other words, it involves 
recognising that the other is different from oneself and may not be needing what one 
imagines the other to be needing based on knowledge of one's own needs. For 
example, one may find it difficult to be loyal to oneself. In a relational situation one may 
encourage or advise the other to be loyal to him-/herself when the other is fully able to 
be, and is easily loyal to him-/herself. Responding to the other as completely other can 
also be said to involve 'not doing for the other what one can't do for oneself. In other 
words, it involves not engaging in false altruism. For example, one may have a 
difficulty in accepting praise. Thus, by praising others one vicariously fulfills this need 
in oneself. 
Accepting one's 'selfish' needs (Haase, 1993) following Jung (1959) can be said to 
be a necessary condition for mature relating. It is when one accepts what one deems 
as one's undesirable qualities that prevents one from seeing the other as having these 
qualities. This facilitates the stance of relating to the other as completely other and not 
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as part of one's own experience. Melanie Klein has coined the terms "projective 
identificationn and "introjective identificationn (in Scharff & Scharff, 1991, pp. 73-7 4) to 
describe the reciprocal steps of: placing undesirable qualities on the other and the 
other unconsciously accepting these, thus atluwing for the first person to respond to the 
other as part of his/her own experience. 
Yalom (1980, p. 372) describes "mature relating" by the term "need-free relationship" 
characterised by "need-less love". According to this description, one relates in a 
selfless way, in the moment, with one's whole being and not with the considerations of 
what the evaluative impact of the relating will have on oneself, or some real or imagined 
other. Descriptive terms for this relationship include: freedom, fullness, mutuality, and 
selfless giving. Yalom (1980, p. 373) states "mature caring flows out of one's richness, 
not out of one's poverty - out of growth, not out of need. One does not love because 
one needs the other to exist to be whole, to escape overwhelming loneliness ... Past 
loving, then, is the source of strength, current loving is the result of strength". 
In summarising: individuation following Mahler's (1972a), Bias's (1967), and 
Josselson's (1980) theories, involves separation: differentiating me (psycho-
physiological states) from not me and the awareness of the availability of the mother 
even without her physical presence (object constancy). This leads to separation from 
internalised objects and independence in regulating internal states. Alongside this is 
the development of individual characteristics. This can be said to give rise to 
emotional autonomy and mature relating. It can be said that the essence of the 
concept of individuation according to this discussion would be the ideas of difference 
and independence. 
Exploring the Concept of Emotional Autonomy in terms of Kohut's Theory 
Alt's (1988) discussion of Kohut's (1971, 1977) work will be used to address this. As 
an introduction, Kohut's work on the development of the self can be seen as an in-
depth discussion on the development of emotional autonomy. By extension, 
individuation in terms of Kohut's theory, may be reinterpreted as the development and 
maintenance of emotional autonomy. 
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For Kohut (1977, p. xv), the self is the way a person experiences him-/herself as him-
/herself, "a permanent mental structure consisting of feelings, memories and· 
behaviours that are subjectively experienced as continuous in time and as being 'me··. 
The self is also a "felt center of independent initiativen and an "independent recipient 
of impressions" - the center of the individual's psychological universe. An interesting 
distinction is given by Ewing (1990) between the content and functions of the •selr 
construct (Kohut, 1977, p. xv). According to Ewing (1990), Kohut (1977) defined 'self 
both in terms of content (namely: self as memory) and function (namely: self as centre 
of experience and initiative and main motivating agency). 
In Kohutian theory, the development of the self involves building up "psychological 
structuresn (Kohut, 1971, p. 51 ), which in his 1966 paper he calls "introjects" (p. 247). 
"Introject" refers to a metaphorical "structure" within the psyche which takes over the 
functions of the "self-object" (Kohut, 1977, p. 84). A self-object is someone (usually the 
mother) who is experienced as part of the self, that is, the self-object is felt to regulate 
one's internal psychic-physiological states as if it were oneself that were regulating 
these states. The "self-object" thus refers to an intrapsychic process or function. The 
"self-objecf' concept arises from theorising about the psychological state of the infant. 
Kohut (1966, p. 245) calls this primary state "primary narcissism". He uses this term 
to refer to a state in which the infant experiences his/her distress as responded to and 
relieved in an almost all-powerful way thus ensuring (optimally) a state of bliss. Kohut 
(1977, p. 86) uses the term "merger" to describe how calmness is restored after 
mounting tension or distress. By ··merger", Kohut (1977, p. 86) means that "the child 
experiences (emphasis mine) the feeling states of the self-object". These feeling 
states are "transmitted to the child via touch and tone of voice and perhaps by still other 
means". 
By building up psychic structure Kohut (1971) describes how functions, once 
performed by the self-object. become modified into similar functions performed by the 
individual. Kohut (1971, 1984) notes three primary functions performed originally by 
the self-object and which correspond to three basic needs. These are: (1) validated 
and approved of; (2) protected and supported; (3) acknowledged by one's kin (in 
Basch, 1989, p 14) He calls the interactional pattern or relationship by which 
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validation, protection and acknowledgement is given: mirroring, idealising and twinship 
transferences respectively. From the experience of being (1) approved of; (2) 
protected; and (3) acknowledged, the individual develops: (1) a sense of self-worth or 
vitality; (2) the ability to self-soothe; (3) values and ideals; and (4) certain talents and 
skills (Alt, 1988). Thus it is through particular relational experiences that certain 
psychological structures/functions get built up, or the development of the self takes 
place. 
The process by which this "transfer" and modification of relational experiences into 
psychological structures takes place, is called by Kohut (1977, p. 49) "transmuting 
internalisationsn. Kohut ( 1977, pp. 50-57) gives a very esoteric, intricate description 
of how this takes place. Initially the self-object is experienced as an all-powerful person 
who magically and perfectly takes away any slightest distress. With appropriate 
disappointments, that is, humanly expected less than perfect administrations to the 
infant's needs, the "archaic self-object" becomes "decathected" that is, is not idealised 
and overvalued in an absolute, all-dependent fashion, so that only the functions of, for 
example, validation become part of the psychological structure in the form of, for 
example, self-worth. 
Other psychoanalytic terms used to describe this process of "transmuting 
internalisations" (Kohut, 1977, p. 49) are "introjection" followed by "identification" 
(Josselson, 1980, p. 190). Josselson (1980) gives a clear deciphering of this esoteric 
language. At first the mother (self-object) is introjected by the child, that is, she is 
'swallowed whole', so that the child comforts him-/herself (or validates/affirms) him-
/herself by replaying the memory trace of the mother comforting (validating/affirming) 
him/her. Later he/she may identify with this introject and experience the comfort as 
coming from part of his/her 'self. 
A comment here is the importance of the emotional-relational milieu out of which the 
development of the 'self arises in terms of Kohutian theory. According to Kohut ( 1984, 
p. 238) "You need other people in order to become yourself'. 
This emotional-relational imbeddedness in the form of 'mature' mirroring and 
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idealising transferences is regarded as essential even after the psychological 
structures have been built up (Alt, 1988). The significance of this emotional-relational 
imbeddedness is also brought home by Alt's (1988) comment that current, what Kohut 
( 1977) calls self-self-object relating (relating whereby the other is experienced as 
having emotional impact on one), reflects (in some degrees and in some 
circumstances) previous self-self-object relating. In other words, current relating 
according to Alt (1988) is, in some ways, emotionally-tinged by our early interactions 
with our parents. 
Interpreting Individuation in terms of Systemic Theory 
Development of the self in terms of systemic thinking involves the dual notion of how 
one attains different states of individuality within a context of interpersonal relating. 
Thus, the focus is on the individual as well as on the interactional/communicational 
patterns which connect him/her to the others in his/her world. In line with this is how 
the development of states of individuality is either impeded or enhanced by the different 
interactional/communicational patterns between members of the system. 
States of Individuality 
Bowen's (1985, p. 472) concept of the "differentiation of self scale" assesses "the 
basic level of self in a person" (p. 473). By "basic self', Bowen (1985, p. 473) refers to 
the degree to which one has, for example, convictions, beliefs, opinions independent 
of the relationship system in which one finds oneself, or in other words, independent 
of the approval, recognition, support, or lack thereof from others. "Basic self' implies, 
if necessary, the ability to withstand the emotional pressure of being different from the 
group. 
According to Bowen (1985), the more differentiated one's self is, the less likely is one 
to make decisions and act on the basis of what feels right, thus letting feelings govern 
one's behavioural responses in a more or less automatic fashion. By extension, the 
more differentiated one's self is, the more one is capable of independent regulation of 
internal states. This would be coupled with a greater ability to regain emotional 
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equanimity independently without having to act in such a way in order for others to fulfill 
this function. 
According to Kerr (1988), the greater the degree of self-differentiation, the more 
energy the individual has for self-determined, goal-directed activity. In other words, 
less emotional energy is bound up in the relational system. Kerr (1988, p. 69) 
elaborates on the notion of "energy being bound up in a relational system" as follows: 
"An individual's functioning becomes totally governed by what transpires between him 
and the other person. He/she is so responsive to cues from the other and his internal 
reactions so intense that he/she is a complete 'emotional prisoner' of the relationship. 
These automatic emotional responses totally dictate his/her actions". 
Bowen (1985, p. 495) refers to the differentiated self as the "responsible I" who 
assumes responsibility for his/her own happiness, failures or successes and who 
doesn't place demands on others with the attitudes of, for example, 'I deserve' or 'it is 
my right'. 
Kerr (1988, p. 101) has divided the scale of differentiation into four ranges of 
functioning: people at the low end of the scale are described as "emotionally needy and 
highly reactive to others". Much energy goes into reactiveness to having failed to get 
love, or in trying to achieve comfort. People at this level cannot distinguish between 
thought and feeling - their functioning is almost totally governed by their emotional 
reactions to the environment. Responses range from automatic compliance to extreme 
oppositional behaviour. Such individuals are likely to relate to others in such a way as 
to mimic early familial dependent attachments. 
Kerr (1988, p. 102) calls people in the next level "ideological chameleons". They · 
lack convictions of their own and thus are highly suggestible in order to gain 
acceptance. They adopt viewpoints that best complement their emotional make-up. 
According to Kerr ( 1988), people in the next level are still highly influenced by 
feelings. They are sensitised to emotional disharmony, to the opinions of others, and 
to creating a good impression. Their emotional equanimity is largely dependent on the 
57 
approval of others. According to Kerr (1988) such people are mostly in lifelong pursuit 
of the ideal close relationship. Such people function with a "pseudo-self (p. 103). 
'Pseudo-self refers to knowledge and beliefs that are acquired from others and which 
are fused with the emotionality of the relationship system. Thus connection between 
an individual or group is facilitated by automatically adopting the shared beliefs of the 
group. In an intimate relationship there is "borrowing and trading of self (p. 104). This 
means that both partners' pseudo-selves are enhanced by one gaining emotional well-
being by having his/her opinions or values automatically supported and the other also 
gaining emotional well-being by supporting or sharing the opinions and values of the 
other. Kerr (1988, p. 104) describes the pseudo-self as a "pretend" self in that people 
pretend to be, for example, weaker or stronger than they really are - the pretence 
occurring in emotional reactiveness to the relationship system. Such pretence may 
also indude compromising an opinion because it is contrary to what the group feels or 
believes. 
People high up the scale have what Kerr (1988, p. 105) calls a "solid self' of firmly 
held convictions and beliefs that can only be changed from "within self' and not from 
persuasions from others. "Having a way of thinking that is consistent within itself and 
reasonably consistent with available factual knowledge ... , is the principal element that 
allows someone to be an individual while in emotional contact with a group" (p. 105). 
These people are freer to have a choice between being governed by the intellectual or 
feeling world. Hence they have more freedom to move back and forth between intimate 
emotional closeness and goal-directed activity. Such people can extricate themselves 
from highly emotional situations with logical reasoning when need arises. Kerr (1988) 
describes such an individual as inner directed, sure of his/her beliefs but not dogmatic, 
able to assume full responsibility for him-/herself, realistically aware of his/her 
dependence on his/her fellow man and free to enjoy relationships. He/she does not · 
have a 'need' for others that may impair functioning, and others do not feel 'used'. 
He/she is realistic in his/her assessment of self and others. Intense feelings are well 
tolerated and so he/she does not act automatically to alleviate them. 
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Communicational Patterns 
Concept of Differentiation in Systemic Terms 
• 
Differentiation has been defined as the "family system patterns of distance 
regulation" (Anderson & Sabatelli, 1990, p. 34). The system's way of regulating 
interpersonal distance can be said to arise out of the microcosmic 
communication/relational interchanges that occur between various dyads and triads 
within the family. The system's patterns of distance regulation is linked to the quality 
of emotional connectedness prevailing (Gavazzi & Sabatelli, 1990). The emotional 
connectedness may be restrictive and unidimensional, which may either impede or 
facilitate the trying out of various disengaging or engaging relational styles. In simple 
terms, differentiation can be said to reflect the ease with which members of a system 
can play with closeness and distance when relating to another member of that system. 
According to Allison and Sabatelli (1988), a system described as well differentiated 
reflects a high tolerance for flexibility, for states of closeness and distance between its 
members. A system that is poorly differentiated reflects a low tolerance for this 
flexibility. In other words, one pattern of interpersonal distance, be it closeness or 
distance, is rigidly maintained (Allison & Sabatelli, 1988). 
Differentiation of Self or the Capacity to be an Individual Within a Group 
According to Kerr (1988, p. 95), family systems theory assumes the existence of 
instinctually rooted life forces: individuality and togetherness. Individuality "propels the 
developing child to grow to be an emotionally separate person, an individual with the 
ability to think, feel and act for himself'. In contrast, the togetherness force "propels 
child and family to remain emotionally connected and to operate in reaction to one 
another ... to think, feel and act as one". Differentiation describes the process by which 
individuality and togetherness are managed by a person and within a relationship 
system. 
Differentiation involves the process of managing tendencies towards cooperation, 
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cohesion and mutuality in such a way that not every action is in emotional reaction to 
others or in response to the directives of others (Kerr, 1988). 
A move towards individuality involves "giving up some togethernessn (Kerr, 1988, p. 
96), which does not mean giving up emotional closeness but that one's functioning 
becomes less dependent on the support, acceptance or reassurance of others. A move 
towards individuality involves a threat to a relationship balance - a risk of rejection or 
disapproval from the other. 
According to Kerr (1988), an effort towards individuality does not insist that others 
change and it is not contingent on anyone's cooperation. It is not yielded by, for 
example, anger or hurt but involves a thoughtfully determined direction for oneself. 
Kerr (1988) reiterates that such self-determination does not mean selfishly following 
one's own directives but an increased capacity for choice to be guided by the interests 
of the group or oneself. 
According to Kerr (1988) differentiation, or how one manages individuality within a 
relational system, is a product of a way of thinking because it is the latter that 
influences the degree to which one can remain emotionally detached so as to contain 
emotionally driven urges. The implication is that if one is aware of the influence of 
anxiety and emotional reactivity on one's actions, one can think oneself out of an 
automatic response. One can think to oneself, for example, 'I am doing this to allay 
anxiety or to meet an unmet need but I can choose not to and I shall handle the 
emotional discomfort'. People who manage to maintain individuality within a 
relationship system poorly are likely to replicate early relationships in order to maintain 
the emotional status quo in ways with which they are familiar. 
According to Kerr (1988), emotional neutrality is a condition for attaining emotional 
equanimity without replicating early relationships to do this. For Kerr (1988) emotional 
neutrality means an ability to be aware of all the emotionally determined sides of an 
issue and to be aware of the influence of subjectivity on one's notions about what 
"should" be. In this way one's ability to maintain individuality within an emotional-
relational system improves. 
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Dialectical Relationship Between States of Individuality and Communicational 
Patterns 
• 
In terms of systemic thinking, entities are not conceptualised in isolation - divorced 
from their contextual connections. Thus the phrase: becoming an individual is 
antithetical to the systemic conceptualisation of individuation as involving the 
development of the individual within his/her relational context (Allison & Sabatelli, 1988; 
Karpel, 1976; Stierlin, Wirsching, & Knauss, 1977). 
Influence of 'Self on Interpersonal Distance 
For this section an intrapsychic conceptualisation is referred to by the term 'self and 
psychoanalytic terminology will be used when referring to this term. 
Karpel's (1976) paper will be used to outline four types of interpersonal distances. 
Three of these four types will be used to discuss the influence of self on interpersonal 
distance. The four modes of relationship put forward by Karpel (1976, p. 70) are: 
"unrelatedness, pure fusion, ambivalent fusion and dialogue". For Karpel (1976, p. 70), 
"the relational mode of unrelatedness corresponds to the schizoid position", in that 
there is a rejection and denial of relationship. Laing's ( 1960) work will be used to 
discuss the influence of 'self on this type of interpersonal distance, namely 
unrelatedness. The relational mode of pure fusion will be discussed next, followed by 
a discussion of the dialogue relational mode. Lastly the unrelatedness relational mode 
will be discussed in terms of Laing's (1960) theory. 
According to Karpel ( 1976, p. 70), involved in the style of relating called "pure fusion" 
. . 
is the process of one partner projecting onto the other unacceptable qualities of the self 
and responding to the other in terms of these qualities and not as a separate person. 
In other words, one responds to the other as part of one's own experience. 
According to Karpel (1976), there exists mutual obligation and expectation to 
respond to each other in ways that automatically perpetuate the illusion of their 
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sameness or oneness. Cycles of guilt and blame may occur as each holds the fantasy 
of absolute responsibility for the other in order to deny their separateness and the sole 
responsibility for oneself that this brings. Hence loss of the relationship is akin to loss 
of the self. • 
According to Karpel (1976, p. 77) the central feature of "the relational mode, 
dialogue" is that people relate not in accordance with an unsaid obligatory bind. This 
bind compels each partner to respond in a way expected of him/her in order to fulfill the 
demands of this bind. In contrast, in dialogic relating each partner is allowed the 
freedom to respond in any way he/she chooses - ways that are not necessarily 
predictable. Hence there is greater spontaneity, unpredictability, and freedom in the 
patterns of interaction. According to Kerr (1988, p. 111) this reflects an individual with 
a greater degree of "emotional neutrality" in that one is not dependent on the other in 
a rigidly binding way to meet various needs for emotional equanimity. However, this 
does not mean to say that each partner is fully self-sufficient in the meeting of his/her 
particular needs. In this type of relationship there is also the mutual satisfaction of 
needs. 
According to Karpel (1976, p. 7), the difference between the "dialogue" and the 
"fusion" relationships in terms of mutual need fulfilment is that in the "dialogue" mode, 
the partner takes responsibility for being transiently 'needy' or vulnerable and thus risks 
asking, and so too potential rejection. In the fusion mode there exists an unsaid 
guarantee that the other is expected to know one's need and to automatically fulfill it, 
without one taking responsibility for assuming the requesting position. 
Karpel (1976) mentions that the central feature undergirding the dialogue 
relationship that allows for mutual need fulfilment is trust. This means that any partner, · 
at any given time and for any duration can 'request' a need to be fulfilled. This 
happens without there being any binding condition that he/she will have to do the same 
for the other to compensate for 'taking' from the other. 
Also, because each person does not respond to the other as part of his/her own 
experience, difference is enhanced which permits greater flexibility for an individual to 
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assume various role positions in the relationship, for example, as caregiver, receiver, 
initiator. In this way, growth and change in each individual is allowed for, and affirmed. 
However, even such a 'desired' form of relating also involves imperfections of times of 
symbiotic relatedness (Searles in Karpel, 1~76). 
Although Laing (1960) writes from an existential-phenomenological perspective, his 
theorising will be used in this section on systemic theory to illustrate the influence of 
'self on the interpersonal distance called "unrelatedness" (Karpel, 1976, p. 70). Laing 
(1960) writes in reaction to the psychiatric vocabulary of that time which for him is a 
language of isolated categories parallelling for him, the split conceptualisation of mind, 
body, self, other, man, world. He focuses on the existential notion of "being-in-the-
world" (p. 18). 
A central organising principle of Laing's (1960) theory is the idea of two states of 
ontological being or how one experiences one's existence. One can experience one's 
existence as "primary ontological security" or "primary ontological insecurity" (p. 40). 
By primary ontological insecurity, Laing (1960) may mean that one lacks a sense of 
particular self-validating certainties such as belief in the permanence, reliability and 
substantiality of natural processes - of the world and oneself. 
For Laing (1960, p. 40), in this existential position, one is preoccupied with 
"preserving rather than gratifying" oneself. Thus from the ontological secured, 
relatedness with others is potentially gratifying. From the ontological insecure position 
relatedness (meaning the rejection thereof) is used in order to preserve the 'self. 
According to Laing (1960, p. 55), this position involves a "failure to be oneself, a failure 
to exist alone", but, paradoxically, one ends up being alone (or isolated) because other 
people are rejected in order to "sustain a sense of one's own being" (p. 55). 
Thus the theme: the influence of self on the relational mode of unrelatedness will be 
addressed by discussing: how one preserves oneself by rejecting others. 
Laing's (1960) articulation of the ontologically insecure person's experience of self 
may be artificially divided into three areas. 
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The first area describes the experience of lacking a stable~ clear, or definite sense 
of autonomy, identity - of being different from the other. Relating to another brings with 
it the threat of engulfment and loss of oneself. Any hint of being known, loved or even 
seen brings with it the terror of not being abte to exist without the other (Laing, 1960). 
Thus, in order to guard against this terror and so preserve the self one distances 
oneself from others, and from relatedness. 
The second area describes the experience of feeling "insubstantial" of being "unable 
to assume that the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, valuable" (Laing, 1960, p. 43). 
The threat of relating is one of being "petrified or depersonalised, of being treated as 
a robot or thing, of being ignored, disregarded or treated in an impersonal way" (Laing, 
1960, p. 43). One may interpret this as a threat of being profoundly humiliated. In 
order to guard against this threat one relates to others in a depersonalising way thus 
not allowing the other to have an emotional impact on one. This gives rise to the effect 
of rejection of others and of relatedness. 
The third area describes the experience of not having a "sense of personal 
consistency or cohesiveness" (Laing, 1960, p. 43). Laing (1960, p. 71) talks about the 
"unembodied self' to describe a state of inner incohesiveness. The individual 
experiences him-/herself as divided between a false-self system (mental) and that part 
of him-/herself considered to be his real self or core which he/she attempts to preserve 
(Laing, 1960). By operating with the false-self system he/she keeps his/her inner 
feelings, intentions, views guarded. In this way, he/she can protect him-/herself from 
the threat of being humiliated or the threat of nonexistence - of being engulfed (taken 
over or controlled by the other). Thus he/she does not commit himself to his/her 
actions as revealing anything of his/her inner life. Thus he/she never says what he/she 
feels, thinks or wants. Hence all his/her interactions attain a kind of alien, mechanical-· 
like quality devoid of any personal satisfaction or meaning. The price to be paid for this 
kind of self-preservation is an increasing sense of emptiness, despair, futility as he/she 
becomes forever prevented from attaining emotional reciprocity and enriching feedback 
from the world. His/her awareness of this isolating entrapment leads him/her to 
respond with disdain, indifference or contempt for that which he/she so desperately 
longs for, that is, relationship. These attitudes further reject others from him/her. 
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Regulating Interpersonal Distance 
Interpersonal distance can be thought ~f as the extent to which, for example, 
feelings, thoughts, wishes, attitudes, motivations, are made known to the other. Simply 
described, regulating interpersonal distance can be said to involve regulating the 
quality and quantity of communication. The broader cultural context and microscopic 
relational context can be said to influence the type of communication that takes place. 
The terms "boundary" (Ryder & Bartle, 1991, p. 394) in psychodynamic terms and 
definition of a relationship (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & Weakland, 1956) in systemic 
terms can be said to be metaphors for this "invisible fence" (Ryder & Bartle, 1991, p. 
394) which permits certain communicational acts from occurring and not others. Thus, 
regulating interpersonal distance can be said to involve factors that influence how 
the definition of a relationship takes place. 
Cooper, Grotevant and Condon (1983) have put forward a model of family 
communication. They highlight four main categories of communicational responses: 
separateness which involves the ability to disagree with or challenge another's view; 
self-assertion which involves the ability to hold and clearly express a personal 
viewpoint; mutuality which involves sensitivity to and respect for others viewpoints and 
permeability which involves openness and responsiveness to the views of others. 
The communicational responses falling under the categories of separateness and 
self-assertion express individuality. The communicational responses falling under the 
categories of mutuality and permeability express connectedness. 
Thus, according to this model, interpersonal distance may be described as the extent· 
to which communicational responses express sameness (connectedness) or difference 
(individuality). Thus, regulating interpersonal distance can be said to involve factors 
which influence the extent to which communicational responses express 
sameness or difference. 
Kerr's (1988, p. 64) concept of "emotional significance" will be used in this 
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discussion. According to Kerr (1988) something has emotional significance if the 
individual is affected on an emotional level by what another person thinks, feels, says, 
and does, or by what is imagined to be what another person thinks, feels, says, and 
does. .. 
Interpersonal distance, according to this conceptualisation, may be regarded as the 
extent to which an individual can form emotionally significant relationships without 
being completely dependent on them for his/her emotional well-being. The ability to 
form emotionally significant relationships while still being able to regulate one's 
emotional state autonomously may be regarded as the capacity for intimacy. The 
capacity for distance may be regarded as the extent to which one can limit one's 
emotional involvement in a relationship. 
Thus, regulating interpersonal distance can be said to involve factors which 
influence the extent to which one can regulate one's emotional involvement in a 
relationship while simultaneously retaining the capacity to achieve emotional 
equanimity autonomously. 
• Factors which Influence the Nature of Boundary 
From Hartmann's (1964) psychodynamic theorising, one of these factors may be 
regarded as an idiosyncratic, generalised tendency according to traditional 
conceptualisations of temperament or personality. In other words, Hartmann (1964) 
discusses two types of tendencies - people with thin and people with thick boundaries. 
People with thin boundaries are likely to be self-disclosing, trusting, involved, 
spontaneous, and to be less concerned about expectations and societal norms. 
Another factor which can be said to influence the nature of boundary includes 
societal or cultural norms which prescribe expected forms of relating in relationships 
involving, for example, generational, gender, or occupational role differences. 
However, the extent to which these affect the nature of a boundary in any microscopic 
relational context can be said to depend on the individual's acceptance and adherence 
to these norms. For example, some people may regard such norms as having 
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absolute, prescriptive power on what is acceptable behaviour in a given relationship, 
while others may regard such norms with less intensity. 
According to Ryder and Bartle ( 1991 ), •another factor influencing the nature of 
boundary is the attribution of who is responsible for defining what is accepted in a given 
relationship. Sometimes one individual may hold the belief that the other is not willing 
for particular behaviours to occur. In this case, the responsibility for boundary 
definition is held to be in the other's domain. Also, such a responsibility may be held 
to be in the domain of some external party - be it family, tradition or societal norms. 
• Factors which Influence the Definition of a Relationship 
Bateson, Jackson, Haley, and Weakland (1956) used the concept of logical typing 
to show how communication is divided into different classes or levels. Bateson et al. 
(1956) discuss the verbal and nonverbal levels of communication, in other words, what 
is being said (content) and the way it is said (process). According to Bateson et al. 
(1956) the verbal or content part of communication is regarded as the message. The 
nonverbal or process part indicates what is meant by this message or classifies the 
message. The message is classified in terms of what kind of a relationship it invites. 
Thus at a nonverbal level the person may be saying, for example, 'parent me', thus 
inviting parental responses from the other and defining the relationship as 
complementary. 
According to Bateson et al. (1956), one factor to influence the definition of a 
relationship is the tendency with which one invites a particular class of response. For 
example, a person may tend to classify his/her communication in such a way that 
parental responses are usually invoked. To use narrative terminology, such a person· 
may tend to rather inflexibly use one particular voice, for example, the child's voice. 
Thus one factor to influence the definition of a relationship is the flexibility with which 
one classifies one's communicational responses and thus invites various kinds of 
relationships (Bateson et al., 1956). 
Another factor, according to Bateson et al. (1956) to influence the definition of a 
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relationship, involves the ability to metacommunicate or communicate about 
communication. This may be regarded as the ability to say, for example, 'When I talk 
to you, I tend to invoke parental responses from you in a rather consistent fashion so 
that I end up being the one to ask for assurance or support and you end up being the 
one to give it. In this way, a complementary needy-supportive relationship occurs 
between us'. The ability to metacommunicate also involves the ability to use 
metacommunicative responses such as: 'is that what you meant?' (Bateson et al., 
1956). 
According to Bateson et al. (1956), another factor which influences how a 
relationship is defined is the extent to which one's verbal and nonverbal responses are 
congruent. lncongruency occurs when a person defines a relationship in a particular 
way but fails to take responsibility for defining it thus. This is likely to manifest in an 
incongruency between the content (or what is said), and the process (or what is meant) 
aspects of the communication. For example, someone may give an instruction but fail 
to take responsibility for defining the relationship as a complementary one in which 
he/she is in the domineering position. Thus, what is meant may not be matched by what 
is said. That is, the instruction may be verbalised in the form of a suggestion. Thus the 
extent to which verbal and nonverbal responses are congruent influences how clearly 
and openly a relationship is defined which in turn can be said to influence the degree 
of risk taken in a relationship or the degree of self-disclosure made possible. 
• Factors which Influence the Extent to which Responses Express Sameness or 
Difference 
Cooper et al.'s (1983, p. 37) communicational model may be used to classify 
responses as expressing sameness or difference. According to Cooper et al. (1983), · 
the categories of permeability or mutuality include, for example, the following 
responses: validating, acknowledging, agreeing with others, initiating compromises, 
and stating other's feelings. These may be interpreted as responses expressing 
sameness. According to Cooper et al. (1983), the categories of self-assertion or 
separateness include, for example, stating a point of view, or disagreeing with, or 
challenging another's point of view. These may be interpreted as responses 
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expressing difference. 
Factors which can be said to influence whether sameness or difference responses 
are expressed can be said to be the person one is relating to - a close friend, someone 
just being met, a respected senior, the topic of conversation (serious, heartfelt 
conversation, casual matters) or the purpose of the conversation (to establish an 
acquaintance or to state an important viewpoint). 
A comment from a traditional perspective is that some people may show a general 
tendency to express mutuality and permeability. However, this perspective sees 
individuation as an intrapsychic property or tendency which is not what is suggested 
by systemic theory. According to Cooper et al. (1983), individuation is conceptualised 
as a quality of a relationship where some relationships are seen to be more 
individuated than others. Cooper et al. (1983) describe a relationship to be 
individuated when there is a balance of individuality and connectedness in 
communicational responses. 
• Factors Influencing the Extent to which the 'Emotionally Autonomous' Person can be 
seen to Regulate His/Her Emotional Involvement in a Relationship 
It can be said that an interplay exists between the capacity to regulate one's 
emotionality autonomously and the capacity to regulate one's emotional involvement 
in a relationship. According to Kerr (1988) the greater one's capacity for autonomous 
emotional regulation, the greater capacity one has to regulate one's emotional 
involvement in a relationship. Thus, factors proposed to influence the one capacity can 
be said to indirectly influence the other. According to Kerr (1988) one factor to 
influence the capacity for autonomous emotional regulation, is the emotional m~lieu in 
which the person is brought up. According to Kerr (1988), if a person grows up under 
strong pressure to adjust to the anxiety and emotional reactivity of others, his/her life 
becomes strongly governed by feeling processes. However, if he/she grows up with 
the freedom not to have his/her thinking and emotional functioning contingent on 
others, then his/her life will be less governed by feeling processes. 
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Developing the Ability to Regulate Interpersonal Distance 
• What would such an Ability Entail? 
• 
This question will be addressed from a systemic perspective. To summarise the 
above section, it can be said that personality (in traditional thought): thin or thick 
boundaries, cultural factors, the attribution of responsibility, speaking with different 
voices, metacommunicating, how clearly a relationship is defined, expressing 
compromising or agreeing versus self-assertive or contradictory responses (sameness 
or difference) and family milieu all are involved in regulating interpersonal distance. 
To narrow the above down even further to fit with a systemic perspective it can be said 
that the ability to regulate interpersonal distance involves sophistication and flexibility 
of communication. By sophistication, what is meant is the ability to metacommunicate. 
This can be said to involve, for example, the ability to communicate about one's beliefs, 
that is, one's ideas about what the other may be expecting or what family tradition may 
be saying. It can be said to involve also the ability to talk about communication thus 
opening up possibilities for the type of relationship to change and so too the type of 
information shared to change - for example - information that is more or less self-
disclosing or information suggesting more or less emotional involvement. What is also 
meant by sophistication of communication is the degree to which one's nonverbal and 
verbal responses are congruent. This can be said to involve the ability to openly 
express one's true intentions, feelings, motivations. By flexibility, what is meant is the 
ability to take on various positions within a relational domain, that is, being able to 
communicate flexibly, for example, confidence, neediness, protectiveness or 
vulnerability in relation to the other. It can also be said to involve the degree to which 
one expresses difference or sameness in various relational contexts. 
• Constraining or Limiting Factors 
A question to be posed is: what can be said to hamper the ability to communicate 
sophisticatedly or flexibly? 
By communicating sophisticatedly or flexibly it can be said that one opens up the 
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possibility for defining the relationship differently, as one, for example, where the 
participants can now say what formerly was nonverbally agreed upon to remain unsaid. 
This involves the possibility for difference, newness or change and with it, potential for 
loss of familiarity or safety. Hence, one can.think of this as involving risk. When one 
risks talking about how one responds in relation to the other, or about nonverbalised 
expectations or assumptions of the other, one risks the possibility of the other 
responding in a way that may be threatening to the person's investments in the 
relationship. It can be said that the extent to which these factors: identity, self-worth, 
purpose depend solely on relationships will strongly influence the ease with which one 
can regulate interpersonal distance. 
Integrating the Separateness versus Togetherness Resolution 
The experiential situation involved trying to attain the ability to be separate and 
together, or independent and interdependent simultaneously. Thus, a point of enquiry 
arose namely, to conceptualise the separateness-togetherness tension in such a way 
that would aid its resolution in practice. 
Early writings have conceptualised these ideas as fundamental, basic needs or life 
forces (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Jung, 1959). Much theorising has been done on finding 
ways to conceptualise the resolution of the inherent tension or conflict seen to exist 
between them (Allison & Sabatelli, 1988; Field, 1994; Gavazzi & Sabatelli, 1990; 
Josselson, 1988; Olthuis, 1983; Sabatelli & Mazor, 1985). 
From Bowen's (1985) and Kerr's (1988) writings, it can be said that this distinction 
between the need for togetherness and the need for separateness is largely contained 
in the distinction between emotional reactivity and independent thinking. The t_ension 
can be said to involve the ability to think independently (separateness) even when this 
conflicts with the emotional threat of loss of group acceptance or approval (loss of 
togetherness). It can be said that Bowen (1985) resolves this dialectic by implying that 
greater separateness or ability to think independently allows for greater flexibility for 
emotional togetherness or not. In order to become 'more separate' one must first risk 
losing the acceptance of the group. 
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In Jungian theory this separateness may be interpreted as seeing the negative-
underdeveloped or undesirable in oneself and so not needing others to maintain a 
desirable image of oneself. It can be said that the resolution here also involves a 
choice - but if made in the 'growth' direction will promote a newfound resolution of the 
separateness-togetherness tension. Using Jung's theorising, the togetherness one 
gives up, namely, the cessation of seeing one's own negative qualities in others 
promotes a newfound togetherness, namely, the cessation of relating to others as if 
they were extensions of oneself. The newfound togetherness also includes the 
awareness of solidarity. 
An interpretation is that the condition of separation is the core of the individuation 
process in psychodynamic theory. This involves the toddler becoming aware that the 
mother is different to him/her, that is, is not part of his/her psychophysiological 
experience. The awareness that the mother is different issues in the threat of loss of 
mother ('love-object') or loss of the other on whom one is dependent and whom one 
needs. Thus, this awareness of difference can be said to herald the introduction of 
various conflicts or experiences of the separateness-togetherness tension. In 
psychodynamic theory, one of the major tensions may be interpreted as involving 
risking the threat of isolation versus holding on to the belief that the other will always 
magically and powerfully fulfil one's every need. The tension is resolved by choosing 
one or other stance. It is theorised that for individuation, one must choose the former 
since only by risking isolation or inability to cope on one's own, can one become aware 
that the other, even though different, can still be available but through another 
relationship - not needy dependence but mutual relating. In this way, the proposed 
resolution may be interpreted as being able to be separate and together simultaneously 
or alone in a relationship but that one must first risk isolation or loss. 
Another expression of the separateness-togetherness tension in psychodynamic 
theory can be said to involve what typically is called the adolescent identity crisis. The 
tension may be interpreted as existing between dependence on known (parental) ways 
of doing things, making decisions, having opinions, values, goals and ensuring 
emotional equanimity, versus finding new ways of achieving this. It can be said that in 
psychodynamic theory, the tension is resolved through choosing the unknown and 
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hence unsafe option versus staying the same. However, it may be interpreted that 
integration of the opposite poles (separateness and togetherness) only comes after 
risking the unknown because only then can one choose between parental norms and 
newfound norms. 
Thus, it can be said that in psychodynamic theory, a value is placed on the 
separateness side of the tension as a precondition for resolution of the opposite poles 
to occur. In other words, one must first choose what can be said to be the 
uncomfortable or unsafe option before both poles can be integrated. 
This contrasts sharply with what can be said to be the manifestation of this tension 
in collective societies. Here the tension can be said to take on the dimension of how 
self-expression occurs in societies emphasising interdependency. This was dealt with 
in the chapter on the self-group relational dimension. A comment here is that in 
collectivist cultures, a strong emphasis is placed on the togetherness side of the 
tension. In other words, in individualistic cultures there is a value placed on separation 
whereas in collectivist cultures (e.g., Indian culture), the emphasis is on what can be 
called integration into a group consciousness involving 'we-self identity and intuitive 
mutual need obligatory and fulfilling relationships. Hence, the value is how to become 
more 'together' as opposed to separate. 
If one uses psychodynamic terms, the characteristic norm of relating in Indian 
cultures can be said to be fused, where there exists unsaid expectations for mutual 
need fulfilment, where others are used as extensions of oneself (e.g., to ensure 
emotional equanimity or to express an individual desire that one cannot do for oneself), 
and where the group can be said to be a potential source for gaining positive self-
regard. The very form of relating that is regarded as immature in psychodynamic · 
theory can be said to be encouraged in Indian culture both by its child-rearing practices 
and by the normative value placed on such relating. In this cultural context, these 
needs are not conceptualised as being in conflict. One finds ways of being separate 
or expressing oneself within a context which safeguards and encourages togetherness. 
In African culture, the separateness-togetherness dialectic can be said to manifest 
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manifest minimally. It is almost as if the separateness-togetherness tension is resolved 
by way of the cultural belief system and associated practices. In other words, the risk 
of isolation or loss conceptualised as inherent in the separation side of the tension, as 
described in psychodynamic terms, is confronted as a necessity by way of the weaning 
and initiation rites practices. Hence, there is no clinging to togetherness in terms of 
fused (in psychodynamic terms) relating as a way of protecting oneself from the threat 
of isolation or loss, one has already encountered loss. As a result, there is no 
emphasis on encountering separation, in its psychodynamically theorised 
manifestations, in order to 'develop' or 'relate maturely'. 
Berman (1995, p. 7), writing from a psychodynamic perspective, raises the 
separateness-togetherness tension to existential status. In other words, the 
togetherness "force" he calls the "fear of life", of being overwhelmed by the world from 
which we seek security and protection by being attached to a larger entity, and 
following its dictates so as to ensure a sense of belonging, hence protection. 
It can be said that an almost universal normative value is placed on the 
psychodynamic emphasis on separation, or embracing "fear of death" (Berman, 1995, 
p. 7), as is evident even in writings of theorists who attempt alternative 
conceptualisations for the psychodynamic notion of fused relationships. Of note is 
Doi's (1963) writing. He negatively evaluates the "amae" concept on the basis of 
psychodynamic, and hence Western normative criteria, when he states that amae is an 
attempt to escape from the "pain of separation" (p. 75). However, the normative status 
placed on the Western cultural emphasis on separation is not witho_ut criticism. 
Cushman (1980) says that Western cultural discourse practices create a bounded, 
masterful, individuated self. This gives rise to an experience of alienation which 
Cushman (1980, p. 600) calls the "empty self' to illustrate the experience of !ass o~ 
family, community, and tradition. 
It can be said that the separateness-togetherness dialectic has minimal existence in 
postmodern thinking. It can be said that the reason for this is that in postmodern 
thought, language is raised to ontological status, and of necessity, so is the 
relationship. Hence, 'self exists because of the relationship. What is meant is that 
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how one sees oneself, experiences oneself, and feels, depends upon the responses 
of others. Hence, the notion of the 'separate self becomes deconstructed. 
Feminist theory, following Josselson (1987), while stating a proposed resolution of 
the separateness-togetherness dilemma, namely, that one can be different and at the 
same time also attached, does so in, what can be said to be, a somewhat superficial 
way. Sameness and difference are conceptualised in terms of opinions. Hence 
Josselson (1987) seems to be saying that difference is an automatic constituent of 
being part of different relational networks, for example, family, work, and friends. This 
may be regarded as similar to the systemic conceptualisation (after Cooper, Grotevant, 
& Condor, 1985) of sameness and difference being types of communicational 
responses in various types of relationships. Thus, sameness and difference are 
theorised to co-exist in as much as communication is said to be varied. Hence the 
separateness-togetherness dilemma in terms of the above description, can be said to 
not feature much in feminist theory. 
Kegan's ( 1982) entire theory of individuation can be said to rest on how he 
conceptualises the resolution of ever-increasing degrees of differentiation between: 
what is considered to be self and not self or what is considered to be 'me' and 'not me'. 
Differentiation occurs when different intrapsychic states originally held to be 
fundamental to one's identity become inconsequential to one's identity. 
It can be concluded that the many varied ways in which this dialectic is 
conceptualised almost dismisses the ontological validity of the experience~ tension but 
does nothing to aid its resolution. It can also be concluded that psychodynamic theory 
closely mirrors both the experiential situation and the way its resolution was sought. 
It can be said that difficulties with the separateness-togetherness tension arose from 
the experience that the psychodynamic constructs of the separate, self-contained, 
independent individual held a normative value. It can also be said that the normative 
value is not embodied in the theory per se, since the existence of other theoretical 
perspectives on the separateness-togetherness dialectic, where separateness is not 
valued, does not lesson the normative impact of the psychodynamic constructs. Thus, 
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it can be concluded that it is not the theory itself but the socio-cultural context whose 
dictates that theory mirrors, which gives normative value to the theory's theoretical 
constructs, hence influencing experience. 
Individuation as Lineal Progression or Recursive Process 
The experience of this dialectic involved the question of whether the evaluative 
influence of being at lower versus higher stages of the psychodynamic lineal model 
would be deconstructed if individuation was experienced as recursive process. Hence, 
various interpretations of individuation as lineal progression or recursive process were 
sought. 
In psychodynamic theory, individuation is regarded as a chronological lineal process. 
The 'self that is theorised to be the desired end point is the separate 'self which 
involves experiencing other's as different to oneself and not as part of one's own 
experience, or as repositories for negative attributions, or as extensions of oneself 
magically knowing one's needs, wants or requests. This 'self is also regarded as the 
independent or emotionally autonomous 'self and the individual, agentic self who can 
make decisions, has personal goals and convictions, can behave in relation to them 
and take responsibility for that. The process by which one arrives at this point is 
highlighted in Mahler's (1972a) separation-individuation process of toddlerhood and 
its recapitulation in adolescence (Josselson, 1980) by which one becomes less 
dependent on mother, or mother substitute for various ego and superego functions. A 
similar lineal progression is proposed in Bowen's (1985) states of individuality scale in 
which the desired end point is ever-increasing levels of emotional neutrality, and the 
process by which one progresses in that direction involves curbing emotionally reactive 
responses that would automatically ensure agreement and emotional harmony. 
Various theorists have highlighted certain circumscribed areas of self or relational 
experience as domains in which an ongoing process of 'becoming' may be interpreted 
to occur. The emphasis here is not on any end point, but on the process itself. This 
process is conceptualised differently, depending on the theoretical perspective one 
uses. 
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In systemic theory the process can be said to be the ongoing experience of 
regulating interpersonal distance. There is no chronological progression here since 
more sophisticated and flexible forms of relating may co-exist with less sophisticated 
and flexible forms. Furthermore, some relationships may be characterised with one 
particular way of regulating interpersonal distance while others may involve different 
and varied ways of regulating interpersonal distance. 
In existential theory this process of becoming can be said to involve the ongoing 
negotiation between opposite poles of various dialectics be it, for example, risk-safety, 
aloneness-togetherness, self-other, complexity-simplicity, stillness-movement, 
acceptance-change, chaos-order. 
Stem's (1985) model can be said to incorporate both ideas of lineal progression and 
recursive process. Stem (1985) emphasises the nonchronological nature of his model, 
in that he puts forward various senses-of-self as potentially co-existing in various 
combinations. However, the emergence of these "senses-of-self' (Stern, 1985, p. 11) 
are described as occurring in a chronological fashion. Hence, Stern (1985, p. 11) puts 
forward a "core-'sense-of-self' to describe primitive affective and sensational 
awarenesses, which describes the sense-of-self in the infant. The "subjective-sense-
of-selr (Stern, 1985, p. 11) arises next. This involves the awareness of one's feeling 
intentional, attentional, and vitality effects as well as the awareness that these may be 
potentially shared by a distinct other. However, the "verbal-sense-of-self' (Stern, 1985, 
p. 11) only arises at a later chronological stage, hence this 'verbal-sense-of-self can 
be said to follow developmentally the initial senses-of-self. Yet, once all th~se senses-
of-self have emerged, each may dominate one's experiential state, and thus way of 
relating, in varying degrees. Thus, even though one may be generating and sharing 
new and richer interpretations and experiences by communicating in language,_ which 
the verbal sense-of-self makes possible, the nonverbal communication of affective 
states, as occurs with the core-sense-of-self, may still occur but in a new way, since 
one now has more possibilities for self-experience and relating. 
The idea of individuation as developmental process reflects modern epistemological 
assumptions of acontextuality, linearity, and stasis. In postmodern thought, one 
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interprets reality in terms of dynamic, interconnectivity such that one can only grasp 
facets of an everchanging whole. Thus, there is no 'self as an isolated, entity and thus 
no process of developing or becoming this 'self. 'Self is everchanging as it emerges 
and re-emerges out of different relational domains by the social discourses and ritual 
practices that issue in its construction and deconstruction. 
It can be said that one can easily conceptualise individuation as lineal progression 
or recursive process by simply swapping the theoretical perspective one uses, but that 
these theoretical perspectives do nothing to change the evaluative experience of stage 
comparisons. It can be concluded that the evaluative impact of the psychodynamic 
lineal stage model arose because of the normative value afforded the theory by the 
theory's reflecting Western culture's dictates. 
Conclusion 
Two overall conclusions can be drawn from the discussion in this chapter. The first 
conclusion is that experience (speaking narrowly in terms of the idiosyncratic 
experience of difficulties in individuating) influences how one interprets or makes sense 
of theory. This is especially so with regard to the interpretation of individuation 
involving the dialectical relationship between states of individuality and 
communicational patterns. The second conclusion, is that the extent to which theory 
impacts on experience depends upon that theory being 'endorsed' by the cultural 
context. The theory can be said to be endorsed by the socio-cultural context by the 
extent to which the theory reflects existing socio-cultural dictates. 
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CHAPTER4 
SELF IN RELATION TO SELF 
• 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter involves addressing the experiential tension in the self-in-
relation-to-self relational dimension. This tension encompasses difficulties in the 
experience of self-acceptance which involves four aspects, namely: finding out who one 
is, being who one is, revealing who one is and being true to who one is. Theory was 
consulted to gain a conceptual understanding of this tension in order to facilitate its 
resolution in practice. 
Finding Out Who One Is 
This involves the question of how does one find out who one is? Defining oneself 
or arriving at one's identity was thought to be a verbal process alone, thus excluding 
any other intuitive or nonverbal knowing. In other words, the question posed was: can 
the answer to who one is be seen to be simply one's identity or can it be said that there 
is more involved in coming to know oneself than simply a cognitive verbal process? 
Theory was searched in order to address this question. Various writers (e.g., Alt, 
1988 & Weigert, 1988) suggest a distinction between self-experience and one's 
identity. According to Alt (1988) and Weigert (1988), one's identity involves some form 
of linguistic modification of 'pure' experience into one's self-concept or how one sees 
oneself, or one's identity or how one defines oneself. It may be interpreted that these 
writers are implying that one can only come to know oneself, or rather symbolise or· 
express that knowledge to oneself or others through a cognitive or linguistically 
mediated process. These writings confirmed the idea of identity involving a cognitive 
verbal process alone. However, this theoretically substantiated idea contradicted 
experience which suggested a nonverbal, intuitive way of knowing who one is. This 
experience involved the following. Sometimes a commitment to some area of life, be 
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it spiritually, materialism, a relationship, a vocation comes to be more than a pursuit or 
activity but seems to be embued with passion or purpose as reflected by expressions 
such as 'it's her life' or 'that's all that matters to him'. It was thought that in these 
situations, the experience of who one is becomes embodied in these commitments. 
Hence, the suggestion of a nonverbal, intuitive way of knowing who one is. However, 
this nonverbal, intuitive way of knowing seemed to lack validity against the wealth of 
theories endorsing the identity construct as involving knowing who one is via a 
cognitive, verbal process. 
Gladis and Blasi's (1993) theorising pointed out a way of conceptualising this 
experience thus giving theoretical validity to it. Gladis and Blasi (1993) seem to be 
saying that there is more involved in coming to know oneself than simply arriving at a 
linguistically mediated self-concept. Gladis and Blasi (1993, p. 357) may be suggesting 
that one also comes to know oneself through "the immediate experience of the self in 
the very process of acting and being acted upon" which "comprises distinct facets or 
ways of apprehending one's own subjectivity". 
This process (initiated by the question: how does one find out who one is?) 
suggested that the use of theoretical terms to conceptualise experience facilitates the 
resolution of a tension in practice. 
Being Who One Is 
This discussion involves four foci: 
(1) Experience of being who one is. 
(2) Experience and postmodern conceptualisations of identity. 
(3) Experience and postmodern conceptualisations of aloneness. 
(4) Emotionality and being oneself. 
Experience of Being Who One Is 
Writers such as Jung (1940) and Storr (1988) have written about the value of 
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vocation in giving meaning to an individual. This reflected the experiential situation of 
one's self being closely tied up with one's vocational commitment. However, it was 
thought that such 'life or death commitments', while being valuable in their potential for 
creativity or purpose, prevent the full and free experience of 'living in the moment'. In 
this case, one's 'essential essence' becomes too dependent on oneself alone. Thus, 
a point of enquiry arose namely, how to retain one's purposeful commitment yet, at the 
same time, not have one's 'essential essence' depend solely on it. Kierkegaard's 
(1980) theory can be said to facilitate the resolution of this dialectic. 
Kierkegaard (1980) describes a process which may be interpreted to symbolise the 
experience of self-acceptance or of trusting. The process that Kierkegaard (1980, p. 
13) discusses involves finding a "synthesis" or "relation" of dialectical pairs: infinite and 
finite, temporal and eternal, freedom and necessity. According to Kierkegaard (1980, 
p. 30), despair is the condition of trying to escape the ongoing dialectic into either of 
the two absolute poles. However, it is only after having despaired that one can 
acknowledge the transiency inherent in "the process of becoming" (p. 30). This can be 
said to involve the process of not knowing, of constant moving, balancing, finding the 
constant, not grasping. In other words, Kierkegaard's (1980) writing may be used to 
describe the experience of trying to escape uncertainty by holding onto 'manmade 
selves', for example, various forms of 'havings', such as: my vocation, or my 
achievements, only to encounter their unreliability thus finding simple acceptance in the 
uncertainty, by trusting. It is Kierkegaard's (1980, p. 30) belief that we are not utterly 
alone and that it is by faith in that which is transcendent that enables one to "rest" in 
the transiency or uncertainty inherent in the existential polarities. This may be 
interpreted that one's 'essential essence' does not depend solely on oneself and that 
by faith in that which is transcendent, one is freed from absolute clingings into self-
acceptance. 
Experience and Postmodern Conceptualisations of Identity 
This section on 'experience and postmodern conceptualisations of identity' and the 
next section on 'experience and postmodern conceptualisations of aloneness' arose 
from the experiential tension between modern conceptualisations which best captured 
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the experience of identity and aloneness and postmodern conceptualisations of these 
notions. These postmodern conceptualisations were felt to be the new emerging socio-
cultural discourse practices. Hence, the possibility of a tension between experience 
and these newly established norms. It was ~hought that the resolution of this tension 
in practice (namely between experience and postmodern conceptualisations) would be 
facilitated by attempting to gain an experiential appreciation of current (postmodern) 
conceptualisations of identity and aloneness. 
Identity as intrapsychic experience can be said to reflect a modem conceptualisation, 
namely Erikson's (in Alt, 1988). Erikson (in Alt, 1988) emphasises two features with 
regards the concept of identity which can be said to be fundamental to the intrapsychic 
experience of identity. According to Erikson (in Alt, 1988), one feature is congruency 
between one's internalised standards, commitments, views, and one's outward 
behaviour, and congruency between how one sees oneself and how others see one. 
The other feature mentioned is continuity between past ideas about oneself, present 
ideas, and possible expressions of these in the future. 
Generally speaking, it was held that postmodern conceptualisations of identity 
involved the notion of social identities. It was thought that equating the social roles one 
comes to assume with one's identity would give rise to an experience of superficiality 
whereby one's 'true identity' would be lost in a maze of social impressions. 
Nonetheless, a search of theory was deemed necessary to further the attempt to gain 
an experiential appreciation of postmodern conceptualisations of identity. The 
following will be a discussion of various postmodern theoretical perspectives on 
identity. 
It can be said that in constructivist theory, "identity is conceptualised as a process. 
that does something, and a product that is something" (Berzonsky, 1993, p. 169). 
Berzonsky (1993) uses the term "self-theory" (p. 169) for identity to emphasise the 
creative trial and error process involved in interpreting reality, making assumptions, 
storing knowledge in a reciprocal, modificatory way. Thus for Berzonsky (1993) the 
'process' aspect of identity refers to the way we interpret 'reality' and thus think about 
ourselves. For Berzonsky (1993) the 'content' aspect of identity is the "conceptual 
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structure" of "constructs, hypotheses and expectations" (p. 172) by which the individual 
interprets 'reality'. However, Berzonsky (1993) emphasises that these constructs, 
assumptions or expectations are potentially modifiable depending on the type of 
feedback obtained from the social world. • 
Berzonsky's (1993) theory can be said to incorporate both intrapsychic experience 
and social features in his concept of identity. What is meant is that even though the 
'content' aspect of identity, for example, epistemological assumptions, can be said to 
be largely personal, its construction, and reconstruction is influenced by, and takes 
place in the social domain. 
It can be said that the social-constructionist perspectives put forward a social view 
of identity in that there is no 'reality' separate from the relational domain. Hence the 
ontological status of identity can be seen to exist only in social interaction and 
discourse. This is in contrast to the constructivist perspective which accepts the 
existence of a reality independent of the relational context but that there are multiple 
interpretations thereof. 
Whether identity exists as personal identity or social role, has been addressed by 
theorists in the field (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Hollis, 1995; Lesser, 1996). For 
example, for Lesser (1996), ontological status exists in the social role. Hollis (1995), 
however, implies the existence of personal identity in spite of ontological status given 
to various social roles. 
Brewer and Gardner (1996) put forward a triple distinction of identity, dividing the 
term 'personne' into "interpersonal" and "collective identities" (p. 83). The difference 
between interpersonal and collective identities refers to the nature of connective ties. 
which they propose exist between the individual and others. It is these 'ties' which for 
Brewer and Gardner (1996) give ontological status to the interpersonal and collective 
identities. 
These ties are not simply affiliative, solidarity - affording connections to a self-
contained identity of goals, values, convictions, commitments. These ties are proposed 
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to be intrinsic or essential to such intrapsychic features as, following Brewer and 
Gardner (1996, p. 84) "self-concept, the frame of reference for evaluations of self-worth 
and the nature of social motivation". 
• 
According to Brewer and Gardner (1996), the interpersonal identity derives from 
interpersonal relationships, and refers to one's social role. In this case self-worth is 
derived from appropriate role behaviour, and social motivation is directed toward the 
benefit of the other. 
The collective identity derives from membership in larger, more impersonal 
collectives or social categories (p. 83), and refers to one's social identity. In this case 
self-worth is derived from the status of the in-group in intergroup comparisons (p. 85), 
and social motivation is towards group welfare. 
In contrast to these social identities, the personal identity in Brewer and Gardner's 
(1996) article refers to the common understanding of identity in Western culture. In 
other words, self-concept refers to one's individual traits, self-worth is derived from 
comparing these in relation to others and social motives are derived from personal self-
interest (Brewer & Gardner, 1996) and not, as with social identities, for others well-
being in and of itself. 
For Brewer and Gardner (1996), 'identity' exists as both personal identity and social 
role. They describe this as "self-categorisations at different levels of inclusiveness" 
(Brewer & Gardner, 1996, p. 91 ). 
A similar discussion (of whether identity is conceptualised as existing as personal 
identity or social role) can be said to take place in the form of a debate on the. 
ontological status of self (Fisher, 1995a; Fisher 1995b; Freeman, 1995; Gergen, 1995; 
Harre, 1995; Hermans, 1995). For Harre (1995, p. 58) it is the way we talk, for 
example, in terms of agency or possession (I will change, or my feelings) that "tempt 
us into accepting as metaphysical the thesis about personhood". In contrast, Fisher 
(1995a) argues that the postmodern construction of self takes away moral agency and 
reduces choice and responsibility to social discourses implying situational determinism. 
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As an attempt to resolve the debate, Freeman (1995) and Robinson (1991) respond 
that the postmodern conceptualisation is simply another way of naming the essentially 
unnameable qualities of selfhood and moral agency . 
• 
This debate can be said to reflect in process the previous discussion on various 
conceptualisations of the identity construct. It can be said that reading the vast array 
of theoretical perspectives on the identity construct which give rise to various linguistic 
realities, is akin to undergoing epistemological gymnastics whereby experience is 
almost dismissed in the array of alternative perspectives each given equal ontological 
validity. The understanding of each perspective having equal ontological validity 
seems to diminish the unique experiential validity of any one perspective. Hence, an 
attempt to gain an experiential appreciation of current conceptualisations of identity 
was not facilitated. The implication of this will be discussed in the conclusion section. 
Experience and Postmodern Conceptualisations of Aloneness 
The experience of aloneness as being a 'real' state can be said to reflect modern 
conceptualisations (e.g., Winnicott, 1953, 1965). Modern thought (in accord with 
psychodynamic theory) places much emphasis on the independent regulation of 
emotional states - social interaction is seen to be important primarily in terms of the 
early mother-child relationship which is seen to be a necessary and vital prerequisite 
to eventual independent regulation of emotions (Winnicott, 1965). 
In an attempt to gain an experiential appreciation of postmodern conceptualisations 
of aloneness, a discussion of how postmodern thought conceptualises aloneness was 
deemed necessary. Postmodern thinking in emphasising the socio-linguistic 
construction of self and the domain of shared meanings theorises less . about. 
'aloneness' and emotional regulation. Postmodern writers place more emphasis on the 
social intelligibility of actions and the raising of language to ontological status. Thus, 
questions are of the nature of what certain actions, emotions, thoughts, may mean in 
any given cultural context, and the reciprocal interplay between this ('meaning' in 
context) and the ensuing communication. According to this thinking, emotions are not 
only regulated in the social domain but their very construction (essence) and 
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deconstruction happens through communication (Gergen & Gergen, 1988; Gergen, 
1991a). 
Thus, it can be said that postmodern thoblght deconstructs the experiential state of 
aloneness by stating that the individual is never alone. He/she is always part of a 
shared symbolic system. Hence, it may be concluded that postmodern thought does 
not conceptualise the experience of aloneness. 
Thus, the resolution of a tension in practice (namely, between experience and 
postmodern conceptualisations of aloneness) was not facilitated by theory. 
Emotionality and Being Oneself 
This section addresses the question: how to conceptualise the 'emotional structure' 
of self. It was thought that such a conceptualisation would further an understanding of 
oneself, hence aiding the ability for emotional regulation and the capacity to be. 
Postmodern theorising, and Kerr's (1988) theorising, while including emotionality in 
their theories on self, do so by subordinating emotions to cognitions. This will be 
explained as follows. 
The postmodern view emphasises that 'psychic structure' is 'built up' by learning 
rules (or expectancies) of the relationship (Beebe & Lachmann, 1988) and a way of 
construing events. 'Psychic structure' may also be interpreted as being 'built up' in 
postmodern thought when the individual constructs a narrative of his/her life's 
experiences (see for example, Harre, 1991 ). In terms of postmodern thought, it may 
be interpreted that one develops, not so much an ego function, for example, how to. 
self-soothe, but a cognition, that is, an expectancy, that an effect (like the altering of 
an emotional state from panic to calm) can happen 'of I do something in relation to the 
other'. Thus, it can be said that postmodern thought conceptualises not so much an 
emotional structure, but a cognitive structure of self where emotions are subsumed in 
cognitive expectations of mirroring or where emotions are constructed in dialogical 
exchange. 
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A similar process may be interpreted to take place in Kerr's (1988) theorising in 
terms of emotions being subordinated to cognition. It can be said that Kerr (1988) 
conceptualises a cognitive structure of self that is nonetheless intimately tied up with 
emotions in that 'self development involves, inter alia, the development of cognitive 
control over emotional reactivity to ensure emotional equanimity. 
It can be said that Kerr's (1988) entire theory of differentiation of self rests on the 
premise that the more one can thoughtfully contemplate or reflect on one's emotional 
responses, the less one's actions become automatically dictated by emotional 
responses in reaction to another, and the more flexibility one has to choose to act, for 
example, on the basis of thought versus feeling, or self versus group. 
It can be said that Kohut's (1971, 1977) and Stern's (1985) theorising best described 
the structural and functional dimensions of emotionality. It may be interpreted that 
'emotional structure', in terms of Kohut's (1971, 1977) theory, is comprised of 'ego 
functions' or capacities for regulating emotional states-capacities such as self-
comforting or self-affirming. Stern's (1985) conceptualisation of the functional 
dimension of emotions may be interpreted as how one communicates by emotional 
means. Stern ( 1985, p. 140) proposes a form of "affective communication" where there 
is mutual communication of feelings, and acknowledgement that such a communication 
has taken place, all without the use of words. Stern ( 1985, p. 140) uses the term "affect 
attunement" for this. 
It can be said that Stern (1985, p. 71) conceptualises the 'emotional structure' of self 
by his concept "experiential integration" which captures the nonverbal, affective, 
experiential dimensions of interaction. This "experiential integration" is symbolised by 
the term "representations of interactions that have been generalised - RIG" (Stern, . 
1985, p. 97). RIG's are memories which (in a preverbal fashion) store the affective and 
sensational dimension common to a group of interactional sequences. These RIG's are 
regarded as the 'building blocks' of the self, as are 'ego functions' in Kohut's (1971, 
1977) theory. 
It can be said that the conclusion that was drawn in the section on 'Finding out who 
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one is' can also be drawn here, namely that the use of theory to conceptualise 
experience facilitates the potential resolution of a tension in practice (in this case, the 
capacity to be). 
• 
Revealing Who One Is 
How to reveal who one is, was initiated by the following experiential tension. 
Difficulties in saying what one truly thought or felt gave rise to a tendency to hide one's 
true intentions, opinions, feelings. It was thought that an understanding of what this 
hiding entailed would aid in facilitating 'true' expression. It was thought that this 
process of hiding was closely captured by the term alienation, since when one hides 
one's true, for example, intentions, feelings from others, one identifies with that which 
is revealed thus hiding oneself from oneself as well. 'Alienation' may then be used to 
describe an estrangement (in different degrees and in different situations) from oneself 
and from others. Various writer's theorising may be interpreted as giving various 
conceptual understandings to the experience of hiding. 
From a psychodynamic perspective is Haase's (1993, p. 30) phrase "the inner child 
masquerading as adult". This describes one's alienation from various childhood 
grievances or unmet needs. Haase (1993) describes that one alienates oneself from 
these by denying them or trying to get these superficially met by various addictions. 
A move towards authenticity involves taking responsibility for what Haase (1993, p. 32) 
calls "healing the inner child" and thus not taking on a victim stance. Taking 
responsibility involves accepting one's childish needs and taking· individual 
responsibility for getting them met. 
From a systemic perspective is Kerr's (1988, p. 103) notion of the "pseudo self',. This· 
describes a more cognitive alienation, meaning one compromises, or changes one's 
own, or directly adopts other opinions or ideas for the sake of group affiliation and 
acceptance. 
From Stern's ( 1985) theory is the notion of how language may be used to distort or 
deny certain experiences when one fails to name them, or names them in another way. 
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One may use language to hide one's intent, message or motivation when these are not 
communicated verbally. In this way, language may be used to shield one from 
accountability to oneself or to others, which can be said to give rise to alienation and 
inauthentic relating. • 
It can be said that these various conceptualisations of the experience of hiding 
provided an understanding of this situation but did not facilitate true expression. It was 
thought that revealing one's true, for example, intentions, feelings involves the risk of 
vulnerability. This gave rise to a question: how can one experience vulnerability 
without needing to hide? Literature was sought in an attempt to integrate this dialectic 
in theory to facilitate its resolution in practice. 
According to Wilber (1985) we need not even experience vulnerability. For Wilber 
(1985) vulnerability comes from the belief that we have a 'self that we need to protect. 
The manifestation of the belief that we have a self that needs to be protected involves 
the identification of any experiential state as being one's essential existence. Wilber 
(1985) exhorts one to disidentify from any intrapsychic state as being one's whole 
existence because this frees one from the gravity of impact which any loss, failure, 
humiliation or hurt may have. In contrast, it can be said that modern, psychodynamic 
theorists attest to the validity of the experience of vulnerability and the need to hide by 
the many theories on self-protection, hence Freud's notion of defences, and Rogers's 
notion of the true and false self. It can also be said that modern theorists theorise 
about the experience of vulnerability in its various manifestations (e.g., Freud's 
theorising about losses and Kohut's theorising about humiliations), as well as how to 
facilitate 'true' self-expression (e.g., various works on 'healing the inner child', in 
Abrams, 1990). 
Thus it can be said that these various modern theories provided a way of integrating 
the dialectic of experiencing vulnerability without needing to hide, thus potentially 
facilitating its resolution in practice. 
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Being True to Who One Is 
The expression of being true to who one is involved being true to a singular, 
continuous spiritual essence. This conflicted sharply with postmodern notions of the 
multiple, everchanging self. A point of enquiry which arose was how to reconcile 
postmodern conceptualisations of multiplicity and discontinuity with the experience of 
singularity and continuity. The reason was not so much to resolve difficulties related 
to this experience of a spiritual essence of selfhood to which one remains true, but to 
try and gain an experiential appreciation of what was felt to be the new emerging socio-
cultural norm, namely, the 'self of the postmodern world. A subtle realisation was the 
immanence of a possible tension when firmly held convictions of the essential, 
continuous self conflicted with the new socio-cultural norm of an everchanging multiple 
self. Hence, the intent to attempt an integration. 
Essential. Authentic Self 
An idea which was part of the initiation to attempt an integration between modern, 
experiential notions of selfhood and postmodern conceptualisations of selfhood was 
that postmodern conceptualisations of self do not give sufficient expression to what 
can be called the fundamental notions of being a person. These can be said to refer 
to the traditional intrapsychic features of, for example, motivations, intentions, drives, 
emotions, consciousness, phenomenological experience, belief or will. 
From a closer look at postmodern writings, the following interpretations may be 
drawn. It can be said that the notion of coherency inherent in the idea of the essential, 
authentic self is put forward by such concepts as "autobiographical narrative memory" 
(Singer, 1995, p. 429) and "polyphonic novel" (Hermans et al., 1993, p. 208) by· 
postmodern thinkers. 
The following interpretation may be made from Ham~'s (1983) postmodern theorising 
about how an inner sense of unity or being is derived from the domain of social 
interchange. It may be interpreted that what is languaged about externally becomes 
internal, private languaging of selfhood, giving rise to consciousness, agency, and 
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identity. These can be said to be the central features of modern conceptualisations of 
selfhood. 
It can be said that postmodern writers do-conceptualise about modern experiential 
notions of selfhood but that these writers do so by raising language to ontological 
status in the construction of self in the domain of relating. It can be concluded that 
these postmodern conceptualisations still do not give full expression to the experience 
of self as spiritual essence, or to the depth of intrapsychic experience as involving 
unconscious motivations, intentions, wishes, fears, since too much emphasis is placed 
on language, hence cognition. Thus, it can be concluded that an integration of modern, 
experiential notions of selfhood and postmodern conceptualisations of selfhood could 
not be found. This will be discussed further in the conclusion section. 
Singularity versus Multiplicity/Continuity versus Discontinuity 
In this section the attempt will be made to reconcile modern, experiential notions of 
self as singular and continuous with postmodern conceptualisations of self as multiple 
and discontinuous. 
An interpretation of postmodern thinking is that it emphasises change, hence 
multiplicity - the assuming of multiple identities and roles. It emphasises the flux of 
experience and concern for awareness into present states of being, rather than 
knowledge of a stable, psychic structure derived from past experience. A search of 
theory presented a postmodern conceptualisation of 'self as polyphonic novel 
(Hermans, Kempen, & Van Loon, 1992; Hermans, Rijks, & Kempen, 1993). This 
conceptualisation was different to an idiosyncratic conceptualisation of postmodern 
thought as proposing an array of entirely disconnected selves. The literature d.erived. 
conceptualisation emphasised the necessity for a unifying or integrating construct or 
'meta-author' of the various stories, or selves in social roles. It can be said that this 
literature-derived postmodern conceptualisation of 'pseudo-multiplicity' reflects modern 
conceptualisations of pseudo-multiplicity, for example, Berne's (in McAdams, 1985, p. 
12) theory of the "parent", "child", and "adult" ego states and their associated 
interpersonal interactional styles, and Fairbairn's (in Lester, 1993, p. 317), concept of 
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"internalised objects". This concept suggests that one relates lo people in the present 
according to rigid patterns of how one has related to significant others (e.g., mom, dad) 
in the past. This conclusion that postmodern conceptualisation of 'pseudo-multiplicity' 
reflects modern conceptualisations of 'pseudo-multiplicity' sparked off the realisation 
that the experience of self was not entirely unitary or singular as initially thought, but 
that the intrapsychic experience of multiplicity does occur as indicated by such 
statements as 'part of me' and 'in two minds'. Thus, it can be said that an integration 
between experience and conceptualisations was found by the process of theory 
informing and highlighting experience. 
Such an integration, however, did not seem to apply to the experience of 
incongruence or discontinuity captured by such phrases as 'How could I have said 
that?' or 'I wasn't myself in there!', and postmodern conceptualisations of discontinuity. 
For Ewing (1990}, the postmodern conceptualisation of discontinuity is between 'self' 
and the micro-context rather than between 'self and an a priori existing continuous self. 
Hence, it can be said that an integration between the experience of discontinuity with 
postmodern conceptualisations of the discontinuous self could not be found. This will 
be discussed further in the conclusion section. 
Conclusion 
A first conclusion that can be drawn is that the resolution of an experiential tension 
or dialectic can be said to be potentially facilitated by its conceptualisation or 
integration in theory. 
A second conclusion that can be drawn from the inability, most times, to reconcile 
modern experiential notions with postmodern conceptualisations suggested a lack of 
integration between the author's thinking (which was identified with a postmodern 
epistemology) and experience (which was identified with modern theoretical 
understandings). This suggests that potential difficulties in individuation may arise not 
only because of a tension between experience and culturally 'endorsed' theory. 
Potential difficulties in individuation may arise because of the intrapsychic tension 
between idiosyncratic epistemologies, or ways of thinking, and experience. 
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A third conclusion that can be drawn is that theory informed and highlighted 
experience in showing that the experience of singularity was not as uniform as initially 
thought. 
• 
A fourth conclusion that can be drawn is that theory allows one to conceptualise 
experience, this conceptualisation itself moulding subsequent experience, and that the 
talk and texts of social life (to use Wetherell & Maybin's, 1996 terminology) convey 
theory into the everyday world of living. 
A fifth conclusion that can be drawn is the following. From the experientially based 
comment that postmodern conceptualisations were heralding the new emerging socio-
cultural norms, the implicit assumption was of a tight link existing between theory and 
socio-cultural norms. However, the conclusion from Chapter 3 suggests that only some 
theories can be said to embody and reflect socio-cultural discourse practices, and it is 
only these theories that can be said to have a notable influence on experience. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
• 
Conclusions Drawn from the Process of the Search 
On the basis of the a priori situation of difficulties in the experience of individuating 
being intimately tied up with Western, psychodynamic concepts of what individuation 
means, namely: becoming the separate, self-contained, independent individual and 
being self-expressive (self-assertive), and that these concepts were experienced as 
societal prescriptions having normative value, the following can be concluded. 
Firstly, it can be concluded that the tension in relation to the normative value of these 
concepts was not so much due to these concepts being instituted in theory but because 
these concepts reflected socio-cultural discourse practices. Thus, it can be concluded 
that the socio-cultural context influences the experience of difficulties in 
individuating indirectly via the theories which reflect its norms. 
Secondly, it can be concluded that the socio-cultural context influences the process 
of self-expression by defining what is experienced or regarded as narcissistic, altruistic 
or individualised behaviour. This can be seen as the direct influence of the socio-
cultural context on the experience of difficulties in individuating when idiosyncratic 
ways of self-expression contrasts with societal prescriptions of what self-expression 
'should' entail. 
In relation to the a priori situation was the question of what individuation means in 
a collectivist culture. It was thought that a theory of individuation as it occurs in a 
collectivist culture would aid in resolving difficulties in the experience of individuation 
by deconstructing pre-existing conceptualisations of individuation given normative 
value by Western discourse practices. Thirdly, it can be said that when cross-cultural 
theorists (e.g., Parin, et al., 1980; Roland, 1980, 1988) theorise about individuation as 
it occurs in another cultural context, they start with an a priori Western (usually 
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psychodynamic) preconceptualisation of what individuation· is said to mean, then 
describe how cultural practices (e.g., child-rearing practices) influence individuation as 
conceptualised by Western theory's constructs. The literature is scarce with regards 
formulating a culturally applicable 'a priori given' of what the experience of individuation 
can be said to entail within a collectivist culture. Doi's (1963) 'amae' concept can be 
seen as a move in this regard. 
Fourthly, it can be concluded that the resolution of an experiential tension or dialectic 
is potentially facilitated by its conceptualisation or integration in theory. 
Fifthly, it can be concluded that potential difficulties in individuation may arise not 
only because of a tension between experience and culturally 'endorsed' theory. 
Potential difficulties may arise because of the intrapsychic tension between 
idiosyncratic epistemologies and experience. 
Sixthly, it can be concluded that the idiosyncratic experience of difficulties in 
individuating influences how one interprets theory. 
Lastly, it can be concluded that theory informs and highlights experience. 
The above conclusions will be illustrated by the following figure: 
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Figure 5.1: 
,, 
Individuation: Experience, theory and socio-cultural 
context: an emerging connectedness 
• 
EXPERIENCE ~ THEORY 
• I 
SOCIO-
CULTURAL 
1 CONTEXT 
~~~~~~' ~1~1 ~~~~~1-~1~1 ~~~~---'i 
: ~ ~-----------®----------~ 
? 
From the process of trying to facilitate the experience of individuation by searching 
theory, various conclusions can be drawn. These conclusions suggest various ways 
by which experience theory and socio-cultural context can be said to be interrelated in 
the experience of difficulties in individuating. 
CD shows the direct influence the socio-cultural context can be said to have on the 
experience of self-expression by defining what is regarded as narcissistic, altruistic and · 
individualistic behaviour. 
@ shows the indirect influence the socio-cultural context can be said to have on 
experience by giving normative value to theoretically embodied notions of the 
individuated person. 
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@ shows what can be said to be a close relationship between the individual's 
experience, and theory, as well as his/her personal epistemologies. This relationship 
can be said to give rise to tensions, as well as to the facilitation of potentially resolving 
tensions. • 
©and ®ask the question of how idiosyncratic experience can be seen to influence 
socio-cultural norms. © suggests, after feminist writers, that this occurs via academic 
discourse practices and@ asks how else can the individual's experience be seen to 
influence socio-cultural norms? 
Gergen (1991 a) discusses how 'culture' (lifestyles and communicational networks) 
influences experience which influences the type of conceptualisations which 'self 
comes to embody, which influences experience which is influenced by culture once 
again. This figure shows how 'culture' (socio-cultural discourse practices) influences 
experience directly and indirectly via theory. 
The above conclusions were drawn from the process of the search to facilitate 
individuation in practice by conceptualising or integrating themes or dialectics in theory. 
Facilitating Experience by Conceptualising it in Theory 
The following will be a particular conceptualisation of individuation in terms of the 
notion of freedom, and on the basis of various theories. This can be said to be a way 
of facilitating individuation in practice by conceptualising it in theory. The- process of 
individuation can be said to involve the experience of being and becoming an 
individual. Being an individual involves the sense-of-self as relational and the 
experience of self as spiritual essence. The idea of becoming an individual involves . 
resolving tensions that being an individual (as sense-of-self) in relation to group (socio-
cultural discourse practices), and in relation to the other involves. The idea of 
becoming an individual also involves resolving tensions that being an individual (as 
spiritual essence) in relation to self (vocational commitment) involves. The ideas of 
freedom in relation to group, other and self can be seen as a way by which the potential 
resolution of these dialectics is facilitated. 
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Freedom in Relation to Group 
Freedom here can be said to involve findi111g a way of expressing one's individuality 
in relation to the socio-cultural dictates in such a way that one does not give up 
individuality for the sake of false security found in having to safeguard group 
acceptance. Freedom here can be said to involve the risk of loss which, if experienced, 
·.may give rise to a new way of preserving both individuality and connectivity. 
Freedom in Relation to Other 
This can be said to involve, in accord with psychodynamic theory, the ability to 
choose, to ad in relation to that choice, and to take responsibility for that choice. This 
can be said to be in contrast to responding rigidly and automatically. The capacity for 
emotional neutrality (Bowen, 1985) can be said to be intrinsic to the capacity for choice. 
According to Bowen (1985), emotional neutrality involves the flexibility to respond 
according to either one's thought or one's emotions, group or self interest, as well as 
freedom from having one's actions completely dictated by emotional responses from 
the other. 
Freedom in Relation to Self 
This can be said to involve, in accord with psychodynamic theory, the freedom from 
unconscious motivations or tendencies which involves self-awareness or accepting 
more than what we already know to be part of ourselves (Jung, 1959). This self-
awareness can be said to be linked with knowing what is essential to one, or in other 
words, what one identifies with. Freedom in relation to this can be said to involve. 
knowing the unconscious motivations, controlling influences, impediments or fears 
linked to that which one identifies with. Hence, the implication is that there is greater 
choice in relation to that which one identifies with and commits oneself to. But one may 
also become overly controlled by, and dependent upon that which one identifies with. 
Hence, freedom here can be said to involve a process of "disidentifying with all 
particular objects, mental, emotional or physical, thereby transcending them" (Wilber, 
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1985, p. 130). According to Wilber (1985) this involves reaiising that one is not, for 
example, one's wishes, feelings, possessions. In this way, disappointments, hurts, 
humiliations, failures, losses are not of life or death significance. However, it can be 
said that one can only "disidentify" (p. 1307, or in Kierkegaard's (1980, p. 30) theory 
"rest in the transiency" of not holding onto any one pole of dialectic as a source of 
certainty, hence security for one's existence if one has faith in a Higher Being. This 
could be the same as saying that there is far more (a greater plan, of which we do not 
know) to what we hold to be of life or death significance, and it is only by having faith 
in a Higher Being that we can live. 
Recommendations 
This study focussed on the experience of a single individual within a Western cultural 
context rather than on the reports of a member of people in various cultural contexts. 
Hence, to further the idea of constructing a theory of individuation in a collectivist 
cultural context, the following is recommended. 
Reports from a number of people living in various collectivist cultural contexts could 
be obtained. The intention of these reports would be to enquire about the individuals' 
idiosyncratic conceptualisations of what the experience of individuation entails. An 
idea of the social discourse practices of these contexts could be obtained from 
literature or by asking individuals about traditional practices or societal norms which 
they see as characteristics of their cultural context. In this way various views of societal 
prescriptions of individuation could be obtained. Thus, one would obtain reports of 
idiosyncratic experiences of individuation, as well as interpretations of socio-cultural 
norms of individuation. 
An attempt to construct another theory of individuation in this way could further the 
deconstruction of the normative value which any one theory holds or conveys since the 
emphasis would not be on the theory alone, but on the relationship between 
experience and socio-cultural context in the creation of theory. 
This could have implications for therapy in terms of highlighting an approach {after 
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Bateson's (1979) thinking) towards understanding an individual's idiosyncratic 
experience. An alternative to comparing an individual's experience of difficulties in 
individuating to normative criteria, held in any one theory, could be the following. One 
could explore how socio-cultural discourse practices of what individuation should entail 
relate to the individual's experience. This could involve exploring how these socio-
cultural discourse practices are mediated or become accepted as real or personally 
applicable, either by the individual's personal epistemologies (how they make sense 
of their world), or by the talk and texts of social life (Wetherell & Maybin, 1996), for 
example, family, work, school milieus. In this way, one could appreciate a broader view 
of an individual's experience. 
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